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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
e Politics of Constitutional Review: Evidence from the European Court of Justice
by
Michael Malecki
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 
Matthew J. Gabel, Chair
Judges who perform judicial review have the extraordinary power to strike down laws that
do not conform to their own policy preferences. eir political independence is generally
regarded as a normative good.In this work, I consider the microfoundations of judicial pref-
erences and how those preferences interact with institutional independence to determine
the policy impact of judicial review.
e following argument is developed in the context of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (European Court of Justice, or ECJ). Constitutional Courts generally and the
ECJ in particular are considered “independent” when they enjoy discretion to act counter
to the interests of other policymaking bodies and their political principals. In the European
Union, the primary political actors are the member states, which directly appoint the judges
and play a significant role in the legislative process. But whether their independence im-
plies policy outcomes that exploit this discretion depends on the preferences of the judges –
which may or may not diverge from those of the principals. Indeed, in standard theories of
delegation, broad discretion is likely to be granted when policy preferences of principal and
agent align.
A considerably body of scholarly work has asserted that the ECJ’s institutional inde-
pendence has implied behavioral independence: in short, that the ECJ has pursued a pro-
integration agenda counter to member state governments’ preferences. e typical expla-
ii
nation for this apparently independent behavior is that judges share a common preference
for expanding the authority of the Court and EU generally. e claim that individual ECJ
judges share a uniform preference for integration has never been tested due to the insti-
tutional cover of the court’s collective decisions, by thwarting scholars’ efforts to evaluate
individual judicial behavior. But while individual judges’ behavior is not directly observ-
able, a feature of the organization of the ECJ, its system of Chambers, provides a potentially
valuable window on judges’ decisions. Specifically, I content that we can infer individual be-
havior from the collective judgments made in chambers because most judgments are made
by different combinations of judges. I develop a general statistical model for aggregate data
produced by subsets of deciders by extending the item-response model to account for selec-
tive participation in decisions. In addition, I explicitly model other known features of the
parameters of the item-response model to enable inference about both judges and cases.
Results show that judges do not share a common preference for integration – that in-
stitutional independence has provided cover not only for Europhiles but Euroskeptics as
well, contrary to the claim that ECJ judges all share a motivation for more integration. In
fact, the heterogeneous preferences of judges are predictable based on the preferences of the
member states at the time of appointment. Extant results about judges’ responsiveness to
member state governments is confirmed with microfoundations, and extended to allow for
selective responses. I show that institutional independence does not imply behavioral inde-
pendence –much less, the behavioral independence that ECJ scholars have assumed the ECJ
has engaged in, pushing for greater integration. Instead, because judges are institutionally
shielded, member state governments appear to appoint judges with preferences similar to
their own.
iii
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Chapter 1
Unaccountable but Representative:
Collective Decisions, Delegation, and
Compliance
One of the normative goals of institutional judicial review is to insulate the reviewing
institution from political pressures that would sway its rulings. In other words, to enable
constitutional judges to exercise their judgment, striking laws that are unconstitutional.
Ideally, constitutional judges would have special insight into the meaning of founding texts
and apply this insight to their legal reasoning. However, knowing that judges, though
usually quite learned and respected, are no less human than other members of
government, practically all high courts provide for both institutional insulation (oen
called “judicial independence”) as well as some constraints such as limited term lengths
and oen diverse sources of appointment. ese constraints place limits, albeit oen quite
ambiguous ones, on the autonomy and discretion of constitutional-court judges. In the
study of judicial independence, which varies tremendously among democracies old and
new alike, judicial independence is if not causally linked to the rule of law, closely

correlated with it. In general, the judicial independence literature generally adopts an
implicitly legalist view of judicial behavior which rejects importance of judges’ policy
preferences. If judges’ preferences are either undefined or irrelevant, the argument for
judicial independence under a legalist model is identical to one that says judges should be
unencumbered in enacting their own policy preferences. Instead, judicial independence is
indicated by ) the absence of constraints on judges through term limits, removal, salary,
budget, and other features of the court itself, and ) the frequency or presence of
compliance by affected affected parties – litigants, citizens, legislators. But these two
metrics confound another – in particular a constrained and unconstrained court that enjoy
compliance are observationally equivalent. One cannot tell whether the court is exercising
its true preferences and the government complies because it wants to show respect for the
rule of law, or responding to constraints that induce a government-friendly judgment.
Observing those two indicators still does not imply that judges are making judgments
Without taking seriously the policy preferences of judges and governments, institutional
and behavioral independence remain inextricable. Whether institutional independence
implies policy outcomes that exploit discretion depends on the preferences of the judges –
which may or may not diverge from those of the principals.
In a distinct literature on a particular constitutional court, the European Court of
Justice, the independence and autonomy of the institution is closely associated with
behavioral independence of a particular type: the issuance of judgments that expand the
scope of suprantional (European Union) level authority. e theoretical claim is that the
Court of Justice has pursued an integrationist agenda, and as a result of institutional
insulation behaved “independently” of member state preferences. e claim about judges’
preferences is that the high level of institutional independence or insulation enjoyed by the
Court of Justice has given its judges the latitude to enact their true policy preferences.
Indeed it is commonly asserted that the true policy preferences of the ECJ [judges] is for

more integration and greater European-level authority than member state governments
agree on. Attention has turned to (non)compliance and the threat of override of the court’s
expression of such policies. e assumption that judges share a common preference for
integration has never been tested. is presents a puzzle, though: are judges’ policy
preferences really ) all the same, and ) so distinct – and in a specific way – from those
other policymakers? In addressing whether and to what extent this is true in the context of
judges at the European Court of Justice, this dissertation engages more broadly with
empirical institutional political science. Empirical institutional political science is about
describing the way that decision-making institutions, broadly defined, shape policy
outcomes. Whether electorates or legislatures, presidents or judges, the endeavor rests on
the description of inputs, the measurement of outputs, and something – a model –
connecting the two.
e primary empirical focus of this work is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which
motivates a statistical model with broader potential applications. Collective decisions are a
feature of a much larger group of institutions that influence policy, but where individual
level actions are not observed. In cabinets and governments to executive agencies, some
administrative courts and ordinary courts, to legislative committees, individual decisions
with direct effects on policy outcomes are made without the possibility of holding
individuals accountable. is collective cover may affect the quality of democracy or
representation inasmuch as it strives to balance competing interests in society fairly,
transparently, and in such a way that it enjoys not just compliance through force but deeper
legitimacy – Easton’s (; ) “reservoir of goodwill.”
e ECJ combines features of an appointed delegative agency, an international court, a
court of appeals, and a constitutional court in terms of its ability to shape public policy.
Like an agency, its policymaking capacity is presumably constrained by its charter and by
the principals who wrote the charter, in this case the treaties of the European Union. If it

strayed too far from the policies its principals preferred, it could suffer some curbing
action to reduce its power. e balance of power between other EU institutions has been
shaped in this manner. e role of the Parliament has grown at the expense of
Commission, for example, both through ECJ decisions and explicit treaty reform. Like an
international court or tribunal, compliance with the ECJ’s policies is far from certain. Even
if (conceived as an agency) it were not explicitly rebuked, or constitutionally or legislatively
overruled, the subjects of many of its rulings – the EU member state governments – could,
conceivably, collectively simply ignore it. Created by treaties, it has a nationally
representative membership, but apart from that and unlike national constitutional courts,
it sits at greater distance, insulated from national politics. Like a court of appeals or
another ordinary court, it has no control over its agenda, a daunting docketful of cases, and
has developed a sophisticated mechanism for handling hundreds – nearly a thousand –
cases per year. Chapter  discusses in detail the specific innovation of the ECJ’s system of
Chambers to divide work. It hears cases arising in national court systems that raise
questions about EU law, as well as cases brought by member states or EU institutions, and
also reviews, on appeal, cases that originate at the General Court (formerly the Court of
First Instance). Finally, the ECJ is like a constitutional court in both its sometime function
(implicitly, in the treaties; explicitly, in its jurisprudence) and in several features it has in
common with other constitutional courts. When it finds that a national law is in conflict
with European-level law, its preliminary rulings may find the conflicting national law
“inapplicable,” effectively striking them down. is itself is the basic definition of judicial
constitutional review. Its members are appointed from multiple sources (by the individual
member state governments), serve for a (renewable) fixed term, and it is the court of last
resort about the meaning of the foundational European Union treaties.
Each of the resemblances above suggests a different approach to studying the European
Court of Justice to learn about how and to what extent judges on the court exert influence

on public policy independent of other policymakers. As we shall see, however, they all
suffer from the common fallacy of treating the institution as a unitary actor, rather than
considering its several members. Each approach in turn has yielded important insights
regarding the role of the ECJ in the EU, which I discuss in general terms below. In order to
reconcile and unify them, the common element is the implications that each would have
for individual, rather than collective, behavior.
Legislatures and executives delegate some policy-making authority away from
themselves for a multitude of reasons. ey may not be experts; they may not agree except
on the need for some amount of government intervention; they may wish to commit to a
policy but lack credibility if they have the opportunity to change it themselves so they “tie
their hands” through delegation.
At the same time, delegates are understood to be constrained. e latitude they enjoy
as agents in discretion is conditional on their not straying too far from their principals’
preferences, even if they are monitored loosely and “punished” infrequently (McCubbins
and Schwartz, ). Backed up by the knowledge that threats and sanctions could exist,
most evidence seems to show that the behavior of agents does not stray far from principals’
wishes. I call this the “invisible leash” argument: an agent’s behavior is observationally
equivalent whether it is on a leash or not. For some, delegation cannot exist without a
leash, and even without observing any reining-in, it must be constrained.
To build a theory of the behavior of individual judges (and their response to incentives
and constraints) requires looking behind a crucial feature of the Court of Justice from
which it derives some of its independence, legitimacy, and compliance: the collective
nature of its official judgments. By masking dissent in this way, the ECJ claims to speak for
all its members more forcefully than merely a majority; and it enables the efficient
handling of its large non-discretionary docket. Agencies derive legitimacy through
oversight by an elected legislature or executive; constitutional courts, through the

willingness of governments to both seek and accept their judgment. Elected officials, in
turn, derive legitimacy through their conditional service, their fulfillment of their end of
the electoral bargain. Supporters of minority parties in government accept the majority’s
policies with the hope that in a future election they might gain the majority and, with it,
the opportunity to enact their own policies and undo those of their opponents.
Huber (, ) calls this the problem of “anthropomorphizing” the institution (for
him, the French Parliament), treating it as a “coherent actor in the political process”
without accounting for the individual motivations of its members: “Why,” he asks, “would
individuals bother to ‘legitimate’ the policies of the executive on the floor of the legislature?
Why would they want to use the rostrum of parliament to educate the masses about good
and bad public policy?” (). e question at the heart of the present work is whether and
to what extent individual members of the Court of Justice advance a policy agenda of
European integration, as it is oen claimed “the Court” as a coherent actor has done. I
develop the necessary theory to connect the policy preferences of judges, the pressures and
constraints on their policymaking capacity, and the observed policy outcomes.
Individual behavior and incentives have been extensively studied in the context of
legislators in legislatures, having largley overcoming the fallacy of anthropomorphizing the
institution. In the study of legislatures, scholars have focused appropriately on the
behaviors of individuals, primarily through floor roll-call voting behavior. Individual
behavior is observed in campaigns and elections, through speeches, and on roll-call floor
votes. Some attention has been devoted to the potential selection bias of roll-call votes
(Carrubba et al., ). Do legislators vote differently when they are individually observed
than when they are not? Even in electoral legislative politics, collectively revealed decisions
abound, reducing the electoral cost of compromise and coalition-building (Cox, ). In
parliamentary systems the internal workings of the cabinet may be well hidden. In the
American Congress, individual votes in committee are usually not revealed (Krehbiel,

; Krehbiel, Shepsle, and Weingast, ; Gilligan and Krehbiel, , , ).
Finally, in most legislatures, even floor votes by individual members are not revealed or
published for a large majority of bills (Carrubba et al., ; Saalfeld, ; Carey, ).
In some other settings, there may reasonable doubt about the sincere expression of
preferences in “unanimous” votes, as might well be true for the  that must be discarded
for the analysis of the Bank of England in Hix, Høyland, and Vivyan (). e ability to
mask individual behavior to some extent is provided for by a majority of constitutions the
world over. My focus is less on partisan behavior (floor votes, party homogeneity, etc.)
than on the behavior of members of other political institutions whose behavior is rarely if
ever observed at the individual level.
1.1 Constitutional Courts, Legitimacy, and Compliance
e existence of a standard by which to determine the validity of legislation gives rise to
the problem of who decides whether the standard is met. Constitutional review, whether
by a constitutional court or otherwise, is an important activity in liberal democracies in
order to uphold the ideals set out in the constitution. Constitutional review is the power to
review acts of the executive and legislature to ensure they comply with those liberal ideals.
Unlike parliaments or presidents or ordinary courts, constitutional courts are a relatively
new institutional innovation. Although constitutional adjudication role of the United
States Supreme Court is generally traced toMarbury v. Madison ()¹ few other
countries and constitutions allowed for laws to be struck down by any kind of court until
¹e development of judicial review and the power of the United States Supreme Court is the subject of
Whittington (); in hindsight, Marbury v Madison is evidently seminal, but the story and context are of
course richer. Likewise,Van Gend & Loos and Costa are seminal in the development of ECJ power and judicial
review, and are discussed at greater length here in Chapter .
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the twentieth century. e power of courts relative to legislatures and governments is a
challenge for democratic theory (Ramseyer, ).
It is not obvious that constitutional courts are the only or best way to ensure that
policies are in line with liberal principles. Aer all, democratic accountability is another
strong normative goal in liberal democracies. Without any constraints, a court could
interpret limits arbitrarily. erefore it is necessary to have some institutional means to
have confidence that the court will not stray too far from the policy preferences of the
executive or legislature.
In order to have an impact, the reviewing institution needs legitimacy and compliance.
In general, constitutional courts – among them the ECJ – derive some measure of
representative legitimacy through diversity of appointment procedures. e judges of the
Constitutional Court of Spain, for just one example, are appointed by the legislature (four
from each chamber), the executive (two), and the regular judiciary (two). Independence of
constitutional judges is usually considered a function of appointment length (though
lifetime appointments are rare) and difficulty of removal. Helmke () has considered
other potential limits on independence as well, such as judges’ salaries or resources
available to the court. In addition, many courts (constitutional and otherwise) tip the
balance toward independence by shielding individual judge-decisions from scrutiny. e
feature of collective decisions taken by diverse membership is a common one in
institutions that balance independence and representativeness.
ere are several explanations for why constitutional designers and later amenders
would restrict the power of more democratically accountable branches and grant some to a
less accountable court. Indeed, legislators even have incentives for endogenously creating
constitutional review (e.g. Whittington, ; Stephenson, ).² e first is the time
²It is important to remember that constitutions are the products not only of their writers, but those who
later take the opportunity to amend them. Procedures for amendment vary, but constitutional amendment
may be a policy tool in addition to regular legislation (Lutz, ; Levinson, ).

horizon of actions that those in power would like to be able to commit to, but have
short-term electoral incentives to renege on (Majone, ). is follows the same logic as
the delegation of monetary policy to central banks (Heisenberg and Richmond, ;
Cukierman and Buckle, ; Fischer, ; Goodman, ). is is essentially
“insurance” under uncertainty that the majority party will lose in an election and wish to
see its policies upheld and the new majority’s agenda thwarted (Whittington, , ;
Ginsburg et al., ).
A third reason that politicians might grant broad constitutional authority to a court is
to seek “outside” legitimacy in the imprimatur of the court’s affirmation of their policies
(Gibson and Caldeira, ; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird, ). Because constitutional
review is an important activity to safeguard liberal constitutional ideals, it is also necessary
for the reviewing institution to enjoy legitimacy and compliance. Legitimacy bolsters
compliance for courts which oen lack “teeth” or punitive enforcement mechanisms.
Gibson and Caldeira (, ), concerned with the ECJ’s reservoir of popular
legitimacy, find that it compares unfavorably to national high courts, which themselves are
not wellsprings of legitimacy. e ECJ’s assertion that “European” legal questions should
be directed to it via preliminary references thus reach quite different audiences, with
implications for the role not only of the ECJ but of the national courts as well.
Constitutional designers to grant review to a court is that the draers of constitutions
can agree on language but not necessarily principle; the court is called upon to “complete
the contracts” that are laid out in the constitutional text but not fully explicated because
there is not agreement upon them (North and Weingast, ; Posner, ; Landes and
Posner, ; Posner and Rosenfield, ; Milsom, ; Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz,
; Pollack, ) . Finally, as with any other agency, legislators and executives might
actually constrain the possible actions of the constitutional court (Epstein, Knight, and
Shvetsova, ; Maveety and Grosskopf, ). Even under new constitutions that appear

to grant courts broad authority, they may not be willing or able to exercise it as freely as
designers may have intended (Herron and Randazzo, ).
Even if a constitutional court enjoys compliance, it might be subject to other sanctions
or manipulations. A court might be unwilling to overrule legislation if members had
uncertain tenure, or could see their pay reduced following a decision to which the
legislature or executive objects (Helmke, ). In the aermath of World War II, the
institutions of government on the European continent were completely reinvented, with
explicit concern for the prevention of another war through strong constitutions, providing
for strong institutions checking one another. However they also explicitly sought to avoid
copying the American model. For an accounting of the spread of national constitutional
courts and their design considerations in Europe, see Stone Sweet () and Kavass
(). On the development of judicial review by the Supreme Court in the United States,
see Whittington (). Today, “constitutionalism” and judicial review in some form are a
common feature of democratic governments (Ackerman, ; Hirschl, , ).
1.1.1 Constitutional Courts in Practice
e independent role of constitutional courts – moreover, the distinctness of their
preferences from those of other institutions – is normatively interesting because they are
designed to be the least responsive of democratic institutions (Waldron, ). Two key
features that speak to the instutional independence of constitutional courts are the sources
of appointment and tenure of judges. e size and term length are detailed for a sample of
countries in Table .; the sources of appointment are listed for the same countries in
Table .. Few provide for life tenure, many for service until some retirement age; still
others hold fixed terms, some renewable and some not.
e sources of appointment also vary considerably: in many countries, judges are
appointed simply by the legislative chamber, others provide for nomination and

confirmation by executive and legislature, or vice versa; still others divide control over
appointment explicitly between other institutions.

Table .: A descriptive sample of several constitutional courts around the world, size, and
term length.
Country Judges Term / Retirement Renewable Chambers
Austria  age  — Specialized
Belarus   years or age  Yes No
Belgium  age  — Language
Bulgaria   years No No
Canada  age  — No
Croatia   years No
Cyprus  age  —
Czech Republic   years Yes
Denmark  age  —
Estonia
(Panel of National Court)   years Once
Finland ≥ age  —
France
(Conseil Constitutionnel)   years No
Germany   years No
Hungary   years Once
Ireland  age  —
Iceland  retirement age —
Italy   years No
Japan  age  —
Lithuania   years No
Netherlands  age  —
Norway  age  —
Poland   years No No
Portugal   years Yes No
Romania   years No No
Slovakia   years No Yes
Slovenia   years No Specialized

Country Judges Term / Retirement Renewable Chambers
South Africa  – years No No
Spain   years Yes Specialized
Sweden ≥ age  — No
Switzerland   years No Specialized
Ukraine   years No No
United States  life — No
Sources: Kavass (); Bell (), GlobaLex (www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex), and various national
Supreme / Constitutional Court web sites.
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Table .: Composition (source of appointment) for constitutional courts around
the world
Country Appointment
Austria President
Belarus President, ; National Assembly, 
Belgium / majority alternates between Senate and Chamber of Representa-
tives
Bulgaria Parliament, ; President, ; Cour de Cassation & Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, 
Canada Prime Minister
Croatia Chamber of Representatives
Cyprus President
Czech Republic President with Senate
Denmark Minister of Justice
Estonia National Assembly, Chairman; Court, 
Finland President
France President, with Presidents of National Assembly and Senate
Germany Bundestag and Bundesrat
Hungary Parliament
Ireland President on Government recommendation
Iceland President
Italy Parliament, ; President, ; Courts, 
Japan Cabinet
Lithuania Parliament confirms appointments by President, ; Parliament, ;
Court, 
Netherlands Government
Norway
Poland Parliament
Portugal Parliament, ; Court, 
Romania Chamber of Deputies, ; Senate, ; President, 

Country Appointment
Slovakia President, confirmed by National Assembly
Slovenia President, confirmed by Assembly
South Africa President from Judicial Service Commission list
Spain Representatives, ; Senate, ; Judicial Council, 
Sweden Government, consulting Court
Switzerland Federal Assembly, with linguistic balance
Ukraine Chair of Parliament and President alternate
United States President, confirmed by Senate
Given these normative concerns, how can we assess the “independence” of
constitutional judges’ behavior? Presumably they face incentives and constraints that affect
their individual ability to pursue independent policy goals. In collegial bodies, such as the
ECJ, isolating the indivual effect of institutional constraints is even more difficult. In most
of the literature considered above, the logic of delegation and compliance apply to the level
of the agency or court — to the collective units rather than to individuals serving on those
collective units. Agencies are curtailed as a whole; courts curbed as a whole. For many
decision-making bodies, including the ECJ, this theoretical treatment derives at least in
part from the collective nature of its decisions. Because individual Judges are not directly
accountable, and dissent is hidden, governments and other EU institutions must interact
with it as a whole. For any body that employs collective decision-making as a feature of
independence, we can’t evaluate its effectiveness at doing so without undoing some of that
anonymity.
In other bodies where votes are disclosed, an individual-level theory has been easier to
develop and deploy. Posner and de Figueiredo () show that the judges at the
International Criminal Court exhibit “bias” with regard to their home countries, as well as
economically similar ones. Voeten () finds similar patterns at the European Court of

Human Rights, with some interesting implications for the ECJ. Four current ECJ justices,
all from post-Communist states, previously served at the European Court of Human
Rights, where their individual decisions were observable. is is curious in light of
Voeten’s finding that such judges at the ECHR were systematically more likely to find
against other post-Communist states. In the European Union, the behavior of European
Commissioners has been analyzed at the individual level (Doring, ; Wonka, ;
MacMullen, ) but to date it has been impossible to get a handle on the behavior of the
members of collegial courts such as the ECJ.
1.2 Plan of the Dissertation
In the next chapter, I introduce and discuss the European Court of Justice. I show that the
ECJ has the means, opportunity, and institutional cover, to exhibit behavioral
independence. e ECJ has, in large part by its own judgments, asserted the means by
inventing novel doctrines of EU law, direct effect and supremacy, that give it broad
authority to act as a constitutional court for the European Union. It also has the
opportunity to issue judgments on a wide variety of cases that are not subject to control by
any government or other EU institution, but which have the potential to expand EU
competence. A considerable body of scholarly literature has suggested that the ECJ has, in
fact, exerted an independent and unwanted push for more integration and supranational
authority than member states desired. I discuss the individual implications of such a claim,
before explaining the organizational feature of the ECJ that offers a unique empirical
opportunity to test claims about individual preferences both innate and induced. In
Chapter , I develop a statistical model for such an application. What I call the “ecological
item-response model” has more general application, however, to other systems such as the
House of Lords and the US Courts of Appeals, in which ostensibly unanimous decisions

result from variously composed groups called chambers or panels. I show how the model
works with varying degrees of randomness in simulated data. In Chapter , I bring the
statistical model to bear on actual decisions of the European Court of Justice. I consider
two potential sources of judges’ underlying preferences, which are shown to be
heterogeneous and weakly predicted by features of appointing member state governments.
I also extend the model of Chapter  by introducing a way to model selective effects or
inducements to the preferences of individual judges on the collective chambers, and test
for a selective effect of home-government observations. I conclude in Chapter  that the
members of the ECJ, though they have means, opportunity, and cover, seem to exhibit
behavior consistent with predictable underlying motivations rather than an independent
endemic Euro-federalism.
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Chapter 2
Application: The European Court of Justice
In this chapter, I place the Court of Justice¹ in the context of other constitutional courts
laid out earlier. I discuss its method of review and relationship with the other EU² and
national institutions, how its members are appointed, and its features which relate to how
institutional scholars evaluate “independence.” I first discuss the basis in the European
Union treaties³ establishing the ECJ, the types of cases it hears and the procedure before
the Court. Next, I briefly review the development of direct effect and supremacy and the
Court’s role in “constitutionalizing” the Treaties. en, I turn to the organization of the
Court into Chambers and review the development of the system of Chambers in Treaties,
the Court’s Rules of Procedure, and what this has meant in practice.
¹ough typically referred to as the European Court of Justice, the official name of the Court was changed
with the Lisbon Treaty, which went into effect in December . e Court of Justice of the European Union
comprises both the Court of Justice and the General Court, which had previously been called the Court of
First Instance. What had been the Court of Justice of the European Communities is now simply the Court of
Justice.
²I use the term EU, which is the contemporary name for the supranational institutions. ey are oen
called the European “Community” institutions or “EC” institutions. For simplicity and because there are no
EU institutions outside the set of EC ones, I use “EU” to denote supranational treaties, laws, and institutions.
³I use the names, language, and article numbers in the most recent treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, concluded at Lisbon, and entered into force in December . Scholars, however, may
be familiar with previous article numbering, so for some articles I provide the former article numbers. For
example, a considerable body of scholarly work in both political science and law refer oen to “Article ”
but not Article  EC.eCommission publishes in theOfficial Journal alongwith the text of each new treaty,
a table of correspondences with the treaty being replaced.
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e development of EU law, and role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in that
process, have attracted considerable attention in the past twenty years. In particular, a
variety of scholars have examined how the ECJ, through interaction with national courts
and private litigants, has established a supranational legal order that arguably exceeds what
the Member States of the European Union (EU) desired (e.g. Alter, ; Stone Sweet and
Brunell, ; Mattli and Slaughter, , a; Garrett, ). e general focus of this
research was how the ECJ, pursuing a pro-integration agenda, was able to develop a legal
system whereby its legal interpretations of the Treaties and the legislation of the EU gained
the force of law in national legal systems. In so doing, the ECJ was able to make itself both
a venue for dispute resolution and, to some extent, a legislative institution (Stone Sweet,
; Rasmussen, ).
Before considering what the Treaties say and how the Court itself has expanded upon
them, it is necessary to discuss one of the key differences among EU member states with
respect to international law: monism versus dualism. In a monist legal order, international
law – and thus the Treaties – has authority above national law, and might provide an easier
fit for the supranational judicial review that the Court today exercises. However it does not
imply that an international court has the means to declare national laws invalid (or
“inapplicable” in the ECJ’s language).
In a monist legal order, a treaty that the national government agrees to becomes
automatically a part of the national law, invalidating national laws that are in conflict with
it. International law automatically takes precedence in this way in the monist systems of
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
In a dualist order – the United Kingdom is the typical example, along with Ireland and
Denmark – international law and treaties have no effect until they are implemented or
‘transformed’ by the legislature. Moreover, any national laws that would be in conflict,
must be stricken by the national government (the problem of lex posteriori). As we shall

Figure .: Number of each type of case brought to the ECJ. Source: Annual Reports of the
Court of Justice, various years.
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see, the ECJ’s doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are essentially monist answers to
how EU law relates to national law.
2.0.1 Treaty Basis and Jurisdiction
e Court of Justice is created by the European Treaties, starting with the Treaty of Rome,
and is established in what is now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU or “Lisbon Treaty”), in articles –. ese articles establish the composition of
the court, its jurisdiction, and some aspects of its functioning including the system of
Chambers, discussed at length in section .. e ECJ has jurisdiction in two types of
procedures before it: Direct Actions and Preliminary References. Figure . shows the trend
over time in the types of cases brought before the ECJ, in which direct actions constitute a
slight majority. Figure . shows the volume of output of the court: the number of
judgments in each type of case. e Court has, with a few exceptional years, issued more
judgments in preliminary references than in direct actions.

Figure .: Number of ECJ Judgments for direct actions and preliminary references. Pre-
liminary references make up the majority of the ECJ’s output. Source: Annual Reports of
the Court of Justice, various years.
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Direct Actions
Direct Actions are cases against either member states or EU institutions. Member States
and EU institutions have automatic legal standing to bring direct actions against one
another, and individuals in fairly unlikely circumstances.⁴ For an exhaustive treatment of
the locus standi of individuals under EU law, see Albors-Llorens ().
Enforcement actions – cases against member states alleging that they have “failed to
fulfil an obligation under the Treaties” (Articles ,  TFEU) – are the most common
direct actions. ese are almost universally brought by the Commission against member
states (Article  TFEU⁵), rather than by one member state against another (Article
⁴According to Article  TFEU, “Any natural or legal person may …institute proceedings against an act
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.” Most regulations are written
such as to require implementingmeasures, and few if anyDirectives or Regulations are addressed to individuals
rather than member states. If an individual does have locus standi to bring an action for annulment of EU law,
it would be heard before the General Court (formerly Court of First Instance), with the remote possibility of
appeal before the Court of Justice. An individual action for damages caused by EU institutions would, if the
individual had standing, be heard by the Court of Justice.
⁵ex Article  TEC; ex Article  EC

 TFEU⁶). (ere have been just four such cases lodged before the ECJ, two of which
were withdrawn, presumably resolved by other means, before they reached a judgment.
Beach () attributes their rarity to the process being “too politically charged.”) e
other direct actions are against EU institutions on the legality of their action or failure to
act (Article – TFEU) and in suits for compensation for damage caused by EU
institutions (Article  TFEU). Direct actions are initiated by the filing of an “application”
with the Court.
Most direct actions are of two types, either an action for the annulment of EU law filed
by a member state government, or an enforcement, filed by the Commission, against a
member state. e ECJ cannot refuse to hear direct actions from any party with legal
standing, but it does throw out some cases on the basis of inadmissibility for standing.⁷
Lasok (, ) lists the main criteria of admissibility: jurisdiction (basis in Treaties);
standing (locus standi); relevance or legal interest (whether the outcome would cause a
change in the applicant’s position); time limit (for example, actions for annulment must be
filed within a period aer a regulation’s publication); and some details regarding the
parties’ participation in other cases pending or decided. e matter of admissibility is the
only means by which the ECJ has any control over the cases before it, and it has exercised
this control with respect to individuals seeking annulment (Schepel and Blankenburg,
; Harlow, ; Rasmussen, ).
References for Preliminary Ruling
e second domain in which the Court of Justice is granted jurisdiction by the Treaties is
in what are called references for preliminary ruling concerning:
⁶ex Article  TEC; ex Article  EC
⁷For example, until the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) the European Parliament did not have locus standi ac-
cording to the Treaty, but now is the equal of the other EU institutions in that regard.
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(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union;
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling
thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the
Court. (Article  TFEU)⁸.
Preliminary rulings make up the majority of the ECJ’s work. ey are initiated by judges in
national courts or tribunals,⁹ by sending to Luxembourg a summary of the case before the
court, the questions of EU law raised, the national law alleged to be in conflict with EU law,
the positions of the parties, and any opinion the national court has about the answers to
the questions raised.¹⁰
References for preliminary ruling have served as the basis for many if not most of the
ECJ’s landmark decisions that have increased its own power and furthered integration.
Moreover, they provide a source of cases – opportunity – for the Court (or, more
specifically, Judges of the Court) to advance their agenda(s) completely irrespective of
either the member state governments or of the Commission. Unlike actions for
annulment, brought predominantly by member states against the Commission, or
infringement proceedings, brought by the Commission against member states, the rate of
⁸ex Article  TEC; ex Article  EC
⁹e Treaty does not define what constitutes a national court or tribunal, so the decision has been le to
the Court from whom it will admit a preliminary reference. According to a judgment in a disputed reference,
“the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it
is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies
rules of law and whether it is independent” (Case C-/ (), ECR I-, ).
¹⁰“Information note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling.” OJ  C /.
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preliminary references is not subject to political control. It is conceivable that member
states’ policy preferences could constrain the cases they bring as actions for annulment, or
they may not want to signal preferences at odds with treaty bargains struck with the other
member states. Likewise, the Commission might hesitate to press its own integrationist
agenda through infringement proceedings. e Commission might want to avoid
confrontation with specific member states, having to target them one at a time with
infringement actions. Preliminary references, sent by national courts, are not subject to
either of these political considerations. On the other hand, they are subject to the
discretion of lower courts. Golub () purports to show that lower court judges’
preferences for strong environmental protection declined to make references to the ECJ
where national law provided stronger protections than EU law. As Mattli and Slaughter
(b) note, however, “courts’ ability to pick and choose cases to refer will be
progressively limited both by the pressure of individual litigants and by lower courts”
(). Nevertheless, it should be noted that judicial discretion is quite different from
national political control. Golub’s () claim – that British lower court judges had a
preference for environmental regulation that caused them to collectively withhold
references – requires an improbable amount of coordination and shared policy preference
among lower court judges. No mechanism of such coordination exists and there is no
reason to believe lower court judges would share such a preference.
2.0.2 Procedure before the Court
For all cases at the ECJ, the procedure is similar. Upon receipt of a reference or application
for direct action, the Registrar sends it to the President of the Court for assignment to a
Judge Rapporteur and an Advocate General (AG). is assignment is nearly but not
entirely random; according to most sources the main concern is the equal distribution of

cases to judges. Mancini (, ) allows that the process is not strictly random (thus
done by the President and his staff, rather than by the Registrar and an algorithm):
“Judges who have dealt previously with certain specific issues may find,
however, that they are called to act as rapporteur in a case involving similar or
related issues. As a result of this practice, one of the Court’s Judges has become
intimate with the intricacies of the European wine market, while others hold
sway in their knowledge of milk quotas or the protection of wild birds.”
Sometimes references are not admitted for various technical reasons, such as those detailed
in Barnard and Sharpston (), but the Court has made a point not to exercise
substantive agenda control in anything like the certiorari process of the highly selective US
Supreme Court (Rosenfeld, ; Bell, ; Mancini, ; Edward, ). e case is
assigned a Judge Rapporteur and an Advocate General, and handled by the ECJ in
essentially the same way as direct actions.¹¹
Interventions and Observations
e positions of the Commission and other member states are crucial components of the
procedure at the Court of Justice. ese are similar to amicus curiæ briefs before the U.S.
Supreme Court, except that only member state governments and EU institutions are able
to make them.¹² In this way, they make their positions known. e Commission makes
observations in almost all preliminary reference cases, having a full-time Legal Service to
monitor, prepare, and argue cases before the ECJ. e observations in a case are
¹¹Personal interview with ECJ Registrar’s staff, April ; see also Kenney (); Mancini and Keeling
(b); Edward ().
¹²e procedure for interventions / observations is contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice (Pro-
tocol , Annex to TFEU/TEU/Euratom, Article ): “e parties, the Member States, the Commission and,
where appropriate, the institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act the validity or interpretation
of which is in dispute, shall be entitled to submit statements of case or written observations to the Court.” Some
further implementation details are contained in the Rules of Procedure.
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confidential between the parties in the case and the Court, with no national government
willing to make its written arguments public, and the Commission claiming its own right
to secrecy under the Privacy Directive.¹³ According to the Commission Legal Service,¹⁴ it
“routinely” intervenes in preliminary observations; it is generally accepted and expected
that the Commission Legal Service will present the EU position on any matter before the
Court.
e resources of the member states vary, as does the frequency with which they submit
observations. e United Kingdom is, based on the author’s search, the only one to provide
citizens the means to request the submission of an observation.¹⁵ Granger () calls
intervention in ECJ cases a “tool for influence” () that governments were slow to exploit.
In recent years patterns in observation-making behavior are still inconsistent and vary as
much with governments as with issue areas, though some are evident, for example, that
“Scandinavian countries and Austria tend to be very active in environmental matters” and
“the southern countries, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as France, put a
great focus on agricultural issues” (Granger, , ). Earlier on, however, governments
tended to make observations more oen when a preliminary reference was made by one of
their own courts (i.e., it was their own national law alleged to be in conflict with EU law).
Stein () highlights the national governments’ failure to make observations in early
seminal preliminary-reference cases such as Costa (see Section . below).
e procedure consists of a written part, in which the parties to the case and any
interveners (discussed below) submit their arguments; and an oral part, in which the
parties lay out their arguments before the judges and respond to questions from the bench.
¹³Directive //EC, OJ L , // pp. –.
¹⁴EuropeanCommission, “eCommission’sAgent inCourt”. ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/agent_en.htm
accessed  May .
¹⁵Even then, only on cases relating to intellectual property as determined by the Treasury Solicitor of theUK.
See “Handling of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union”, available at www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-
policy/policy-information/ecj/ecj-refs.htm. Intellectual Property Office, United Kingdom. Accessed  April
.
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Prior to the oral part the Judge Rapporteur prepares a summary of the written part called
the “Report for the Hearing” (Rapport d’Audience) which, until , was published along
with the judgements but since then is made available only on the day of the hearing in the
language of the case. Registry and translation service staff claim that this is due to the
translation burden; now, the Report for Hearing exists only in the language of the case.¹⁶
Shortly thereaer, the Advocate General synthesizes the written and oral arguments
and presents his or her Opinion before the Court. e Judges deliberate in secret, vote by
majority (in order of reverse seniority)¹⁷, and issue a judgment.
In the oral procedure, all of the parties to the case, which include the national
government or the Commission through “interventions” (direct actions) and
“observations” (preliminary references) present their arguments to the Court. For
preliminary references, the language of the case may be any of the  official languages of
the EU. In practice the language of the case is most oen French, German, or English.¹⁸
Many portions of the oral procedure are based on the written submissions. e judges ask
questions of the lawyers for each of the parties, in an exchange that can be as spirited as any
between bench and bar (Edward, ).
e lawyers present at the oral procedure may be any designee qualified at the bar of
their member state. In other words, government observations and interventions are oen
argued by lawyers in private practice contracted by their national governments. In other
cases, lawyers employed by the government may prepare and present the case. As with the
allocation of national resources to monitor references and make observations, these
practices vary considerably among member states. According to several private lawyers,
¹⁶Personal interview with Registrar and Translation Service staff.
¹⁷Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, OJ  L , p. ; OJ  L  (corrigenda); and 
further amendments. e Court publishes an unofficial consolidated text of its Rules of Procedure at cu-
ria.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_, accessed  April .
¹⁸Personal interview with registrar, interpretation, and translation staff, April .
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they develop an expertise in arguing cases before the ECJ, but also in specific subject areas
for which they expect to be called upon by the government in the future.
Although the Rules of Procedure allow the Court to rule without an opinion prepared
by the Advocate General following the oral procedure¹⁹ in most cases the AG assigned to
the case dras an opinion, drawing on previous case-law and the written and oral
arguments.
Deliberation and Judgment
Only a few people – the judges and former judges – know firsthand what deliberations at
the ECJ look like. Several of them have written about their time at the court, following
their service. Both Edward () and Mancini and Keeling (b) describe the process
in some detail. e hearing judges formally present their opinions in order from junior to
senior. e AG is not present at deliberations.
Interestingly, the Judge Rapporteur is obliged to write the text of the judgment even
when he disagrees with the majority opinion: “He must still dra the judgment in spite of
his dissent. In Washington an altogether healthier practice has developed, whereby a
member of the majority is designated to write the Court’s ‘opinion’” (Mancini, , ).
Former Judge Edward saw value in the continued active participation of minority
judges:
e minority may be quite as active as the majority in testing the soundness of
the legal reasoning in the dra. … Subsequent discussion, which may go on
over weeks or even months, may produce changes of allegiance and it may be
very difficult to remember, when the judgment is finally approved, who voted
which way at the beginning. e Court may indeed only be able to agree as to
¹⁹Article a, Protocol  TFEU, Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. e  revision of
the Protocol allowed the Court to dismiss with the AG opinion.
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the real issue in the case aer the Rapporteur has produced several different
dras, so the initial vote may become totally irrelevant by the end” (Edward,
, ).
Nevertheless, the final judgment with respect to the parties, irrespective of the
language used, is decided by a majority vote of the judges hearing the case. For a judge in
the voting minority, whatever his involvement in the legal reasoning, “All he can do is grit
his teeth and sign the ostensibly unanimous, collegiate judgment” (Mancini, , ).
2.1 The ECJ’s role in making the Treaties a Constitution and
Itself their Interpreter
In most accounts of European integration, the Court is portrayed as pushing the federalist
cause beyond what member states agreed to in the Treaties. It did so either by strategically
finding the outermost limit of supranational power acceptable to member state
governments (Garrett, ), or as a result of the mask of technical legal language and
shield of civil-law traditions of judicial political independence (Mattli and Slaughter, ,
b). In either account, the Court is portrayed as having a uniform collective preference
for a greater degree of European integration, and more power for the supranational EU
institutions, than a majority of member state governments. e evidence for this claim
seems to be that because the Court found the opportunity, through the preliminary
reference procedure described in Section .., and it found themeans, described below, to
advance a Euro-federalist agenda, increasing the scope of EU law and the authority of EU
institutions over national ones.
e ECJ’s assertion that “European” legal questions should be directed to it via
preliminary references thus reach quite different audiences, with implications for the role
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not only of the ECJ itself but of the national courts. e instruments at the core of
establishing the ECJ as a constitutional court for the European Union are well known and
well studied. e ECJ decides constitutional questions, advising that national laws are
“inapplicable” when they conflict with EU law. It encouraged lower national courts to
make references about questions of European law and asserted that it is their responsibility
to ensure the application of European law over national laws. It has rejected the claim that
only national constitutional or special courts could make references. us, preliminary
references provide the ECJ judges with a unique and unfettered opportunity to pursue an
agenda independent of member state governments’ control.
e preliminary reference system provides more than just a steady stream of cases,
though. e nature of the cases themselves is more likely, given the confrontational nature
of legal proceedings, to lie at the boundary of EU law, and thus presenting the ECJ greater
opportunity to expand that boundary. Litigants have incentives to raise points of EU law
and creatively interpret it to their advantage. In turn they prompt national court judges to
refer questions to the ECJ. is contrasts sharply with direct actions, both by the member
states, which engage primarily in actions for annulment, and the Commission, which may
under many circumstances hesitate to bring infringement actions targeting member states.
e preliminary reference system produces a great variety of opportunities to define the
boundary of EU law.
However, the opportunity to rule on cases of the character described above does not
imply the means to promote integration. e capacity alone to review cases relevant to EU
law does still does not imply that the court can implement its vision of an EU legal order.
Specifically, themeans are not implied: the ECJ is not necessarily the solitary venue where
questions of EU law are decided, as opposed to within the national courts systems or
national constitutional courts. e following is a discussion of how the court asserted the
dominant authority of the Treaties and its primacy in interpreting them.

LikeMarbury vMadison () in the United States was central in establishing judicial
review by the Supreme Court, a series of ECJ judgments established the twin doctrines of
“direct effect” and “supremacy” for EU law. Just as Whittington () argues thatMarbury
did not necessarily imply judicial supremacy, neither did the Treaties alone nor even the
key judgments of the ECJ: “constitutionalisation was neither preordained by the Treaties,
nor an unforeseen consequence of them (e.g., as a result of functional spillover)”
(Stone Sweet, , ). As withMarbury, the development of judicial review is more
complicated than the issuance of judgments that are later recognized as seminal.
e Treaties became the ‘constitutional charter’ (irrespective of the failed dra
Constitutional Treaty, and subsequent scrubbing of the word “constitution” from the
Lisbon Treaty) chiefly through judgments made by the ECJ and the subsequent acceptance
of those judgments by the member states. Below, I summarize briefly how the ECJ created
judicial constitutional review for itself and national courts.
e legal doctrine of direct effect of EU law, even in the absence of national law
implementing or transposing the EU law, was established in the  judgment called Van
Gend & Loos²⁰ e next year, the judgment in Costa v E.N.E.L²¹ asserted the doctrine of
supremacy, writing, “the Member States have limited their sovereign rights …and have
thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.” It has gone on
without rebuke to call the Treaties the “constitutional charter” ²² Costa asserted both that
national law was subject to review by the Court of Justice, but also empowered the national
and subnational courts to engage in that review of national law with it through the
preliminary reference procedure. Both of the seminal cases (Costa and Van Gend & Loos
establishing the ECJ as the ultimate interpreter of the Treaties and the place of the Treaties
²⁰Case / NV Algemene Transport– en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration () ECR .
²¹Case / Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. () ECR .
²²Case / Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament () ECR .

as a “constitutional charter” were judgments issued in cases that came before the ECJ as
references for a preliminary ruling from national courts.
Costamade the ECJ’s rulings on preliminary references authoritative and far-reaching
in that they applied not only to the requesting court but to all national courts. Another
case, ²³ widened their applicability even further: “those rulings were now to have
authority for situations in which the point of law was the same, even though the questions
posed in earlier cases were different, and even though the proceedings in which the issue
originally rose differed.”
Direct Effect
e Van Gend & Loos decision laid out four novel assertions which had a profound impact
on the subsequent development of EU law, the ECJ’s role, and the role of national courts:
. “e Community constitutes a new legal order of international law”;
. “[Member] States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,”
and in those fields, specifically related to the development of the Common Market,
transferred them to the Community institutions;
. “Community law has an authority which can be invoked by [individuals] before
[national] courts and tribunals;
. “Community law … not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage,” that is, part of
national law.
At issue in Van Gend & Loos was whether Treaty Article  EEC had direct effect.
Article  of the Treaty of Rome read, “Member States shall refrain from introducing
²³Case / Srl  and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA vMinistry of Health, () ECR .
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between themselves any new customs duties on imports and exports or any charges having
equivalent effect, and from increasing those which they already apply in their trade with
each other.” e company Van Gend & Loos alleged that the Netherlands had introduced a
new customs duty on urea formaldehyde, raising the tax from  to , aer the entry
into force of the Treaty. e ECJ held that the obligation in Article  was “clear and
unconditional”²⁴ and therefore produced direct effects in the relationship between member
state and citizen.
Further judgments defined which provisions had direct effect and which did not, in
more specific terms than the “clear and unconditional” specified in Van Gend & Loos . So,
Article  EEC²⁵ did not have direct effect because it sets out a general objective and implies
that implementing national legislation is needed. e condition that such provisions be
“sufficiently precise” leaves room for interpretation; thus although the German
government claimed that Article  EEC’s use of the phrase “similar domestic products”
was not sufficiently precise, the Court held in Fink-Frucht²⁶ that “Although this provision
involves the evaluation of economic factors, this does not exclude the right and duty of
national courts to ensure that the rules of the treaty are observed whenever they can
ascertain that the conditions necessary for the application of the article are fulfilled.” Not
such “economic factors” give rise to direct effects, however; in Salgoil²⁷ the ECJ denied the
direct effect of Treaty articles relating to import quotas as a function of “total value” and
“national production”, both of which terms were too vague to confer obligations on
member states. Moreover, to be directly effective, an article of EU law (treaty, regulation,
directive, or decision) must not be subject to other conditions, such as a decision by the
²⁴e criteria the Court has defined and elaborated upon oen go by the French term acte claire.
²⁵“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of
the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.
ey shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks.”
²⁶Fink-Frucht v Hauptzollamt Münchent-Landsbergstrasse, Case / () ECR .
²⁷Salgoil v Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade, Case / () ECR .
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Commission or the Council, as is the case with state aid (see Case /, Capolongo v
Azienda agricola Maya () ECR ).
In subsequent cases the ECJ went further than it had in Van Gend & Loos , where it
held that Treaty provisions created direct effects. Not only did the clear and unconditional
provisions of the Treaties produce such obligations directly. So too might EU regulations,
directives, decisions, and treaties between the EU and third countries. us in Ratti²⁸ it
held that secondary legislation such as Regulations “are directly applicable, and
consequently, capable of producing direct effects.” Further, even EU Directives, which
generally require implementing laws, may produce direct effects for citizens: “A Member
State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the
prescribed period may not rely… on its own failure to perform the obligations which the
directive entails.”
e doctrine of direct effect is inherently monist. In a dualist framework, national
governments would be able to decide that they did not, in fact, have direct obligations
stemming from EU Treaties or secondary legislation. By contrast, the ECJ’s articulation of
direct effect says that many EU laws are automatically a part of national law and therefore
must be applied by national courts.
Supremacy
e doctrine of Direct Effect and the sweeping judgment in Van Gend & Loos were but one
of the bases on which the ECJ defined its central role in constitutional adjudication. e
second is the concept of supremacy, that when an EU-level law (treaty article, directive,
regulation) is in conflict with a national law, it is the EU law that should be applied.
Although implicit in Van Gend & Loos the judgment in Costa v E.N.E.L²⁹ the following
²⁸Case /, Publico Ministerio v Ratti () ECR .
²⁹Case / Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. () ECR .
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year asserted the doctrine of supremacy, writing, “the Member States have limited their
sovereign rights …and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals
and themselves.” e court advanced four arguments for the supremacy of EU law:
. the EU represents “a Community… having its own institutions, its own personality,
its own legal capacity;”
. “it [is] impossible for the States… to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity”
(emphasis added);
. “Member states have limited their sovereign rights;”
. “Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent
domestic laws” (the consistency and integrity of the EU law.
Further rulings crystallized the power of judicial review and the mutual relationship
between the ECJ and national courts. e next critical case is Simmenthal,³⁰ which pressed
ordinary, lower courts into the service of EU law. e case dealt with what the ECJ ruled
was a barrier to the free movement of goods (in this case beef and veal) and a violation of a
community Regulation passed in . Italy however had passed its law in , and its
constitutional court had already upheld the constitutionality of its law which established an
inspection régime. e lower-court judge who had referred the case asked whether his
court, rather than only the Italian Constitutional Court, could find the Italian law in
violation of EU law. e ECJ’s judgment held,
“Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community
law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals
and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may
³⁰Case / Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA () ECR .
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conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule”
(Simmenthal, para. ).
e same year, in the Factortame series of cases,³¹ arising as references for preliminary
ruling from the United Kingdom against a Spanish fishing company, national court judges
were granted even broader authority to strike national laws.³²
e boldness of the supremacy claim was recognized immediately. Indeed Italy did not
send another reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ for four years;³³ the
“acceptance” of supremacy by both ordinary courts and constitutional courts in Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom is the subject of the first
part of Slaughter, Stone Sweet, and Weiler (). In each of them, national constitutions,
and existing institutions’ place in any hierarchy, steered the path for eventual (oen
reluctant) acceptance of the supremacy of EU law, even in monist legal orders.
Although generally credited in the political science literature to Alter (); Alter and
Meunier-Aitsahalia (), the enlistment of national courts to bolster the status of the
Court of Justice has been asserted by a retired ECJ Judge in , who calls national courts
and the Commission “mighty allies” as “the Court sought to ‘constitutionalize’ the Treaty,
that is to fashion a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe”
(Mancini, , –). Later, he somewhat coyly calls the doctrine of supremacy, though
now “undisputed,” “the product of judicial creativeness” (Mancini, , ).
Regardless, national courts – even in countries in which they are not endowed with
judicial review (the power to strike down laws) – have effectively teamed with the ECJ in
the constitutionalization of the Treaties. Slaughter, Stone Sweet, and Weiler () provide
the best summary of the circumstances in various countries that led to the acceptance of
³¹see “Factortame I and II”,e Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others
Case C-/ () ECR I- and Case C-/ () I-.
³²Hartley (, ) draws a narrow distinction between invalidating or “making void” national provisions
and declaring them “inapplicable.”
³³e next case, Salgoil, was referred by an order on  July .
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the ECJ’s doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. Alter (, ) calls this a strategy of
“mutual empowerment.” e use of preliminary references by the national courts is
evidence of the acceptance of supremacy of EU law.
e ECJ has long maintained that it believes its judgments, though they are not binding
in the same way as precedent in common-law systems, should be followed in a
precedent-like manner, both in its own future judgments and by national courts (Lasok,
). is claim was made explicit in its ruling in International Chemical Corporation:³⁴
“although a judgment of the court given [in a preliminary reference] declaring
an act of an institution, in particular a council or commission regulation, to be
void is directly addressed only to the national court which brought the matter
before the court, it is sufficient reason for any other national court to regard
that act as void for the purposes of a judgment which is has to give; that
assertion does not however mean that national courts are deprived of [the
right to make their own reference to the ECJ]” (para. ).
is has led some to conclude that the case-law of the ECJ amounts to a “common law for
Europe” (Edward, , ), despite the fact that the vast majority of the countries have a
civil law tradition.
Expanding the Scope of EU Law
e ECJ has also expanded the scope of European political integration by its interpretation
of the Treaties. Specifically, it has read into them implications for EU law protecting the
environment, women’s rights, and human rights; in short, a broad range of policy areas
beyond the four economic freedoms (the free movement of persons, goods, capital, and
services). is expansion of EU competences has occurred in a wide variety of policy
³⁴Case / International Chemical Corporation () ECR .
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domains from environmental law to pensions and health to women’s rights (Cichowski,
, ; Hoskyns, ; Mazey, ; Cichowski, ; Conant, ; Stone Sweet and
Brunell, ).
e Court’s approach to basic fundamental rights or human rights protections is
illustrative. e ECJ asserted that EU law protected basic rights in the s, but no
mention of fundamental rights was introduced to the Treaties until the Lisbon Treaty in
. us EU law has had protections of fundamental rights above and beyond those of
many national constitutions, solely as a result of the ECJ’s action.
By some accounts, this is an example of functional spillover (Mattli and Slaughter,
a; Alter, , , ; Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia, ; Mattli and Slaughter,
; Burley and Mattli, ). Based in the economic freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaties for the establishment of a common market, the Court read into the Treaties a
much broader notion of basic rights. Moreover, the economic rights with which the
Treaties were concerned overlapped, in a sense, with broader human rights, in particular
the guarantee of equal pay for equal work between male and female workers, and in the
free movement of workers.
In a series of judgments the ECJ read into the Treaties the same protections as the
German constitution. Subsequently, the German Constitutional Court affirmed that the
ECJ’s protection of human rights was sufficient. e approach of the ECJ can be viewed as
a strategic maneuver to assure the acceptance of supremacy by the German Constitutional
Court. Starting with Stauder³⁵ and Internationale Handelsgesellscha³⁶ the ECJ recognized
a general right of liberty, and declared that EU law protected it. is was important for the
acceptance of supremacy in Germany; it would have been a contradiction to accept the
³⁵Case / Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt () ECR .
³⁶Case / Internationale Handelsgesellscha v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel
() ECR .

supremacy of EU law without its protection of the same human rights as the German basic
laws. Nold³⁷ and Rutili³⁸ pushed even further: in Nold the Court held,
“[F]undamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the
law, the observance of which it ensures; that in safeguarding those rights, the
Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with the
fundamental rights recognized by the constitutions of those States are
unacceptable in the Community; and that, similarly, international treaties for
the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated
or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be
followed within the framework of Community law” (Weiler, , fn).
e ECJ’s judgments in Rutili and Hauer³⁹ made nearly identical claims, but with specific
application to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which all member
states at the time were signatories individually, but which was not a part of EU law.
In the area of sex discrimination, the Court has found horizontal direct effect of EU
Treaties, where it declined to do so in . e landmark judgment in Defrenne⁴⁰ held
that the Treaty Article guaranteeing equal pay had direct effect and created not only
“vertical direct effect” or obligations upon member states as above, but “horizontal direct
effect”, creating rights for individuals enforceable in private contracts. As with the other
“economic” cases establishing (vertical) direct effect, the ECJ cast itself as the lead
interpreter. Even in cases where it essentially must balance the Treaty’s guarantee of free
movement against and the Court’s own interpretation of fundamental rights, the ECJ oen
³⁷Case / J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellscha () ECR .
³⁸Case / Roland Rutili vMinistre de l’intérieur () ECR 
³⁹In Case / Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz () ECR 
⁴⁰Case - Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge Sabena () ECR .
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rules in favor of the latter.⁴¹ It has done so with the tacit support of the national courts
through the preliminary reference system.
e relationships between EU institutions, EU law, and the ECHR protections of
fundamental rights are somewhat nebulous. e Treaty on European Union (TEU,
“Maastrict Treaty”) which entered into force in , was the first to include any language
about human rights protections, and it used essentially the same language that the ECJ had
in Nold and Rutili: Article  TEU set forth the general principle of “respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms… as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.” However, in  the ECJ advised the Council that the Treaties did not
give the EU the power to set down laws or conclude international agreements on human
rights.⁴² rough the next several treaty revisions the EU still lacked this competence,
until (as with the Charter of Fundamental Rights) it was included in the Lisbon Treaty; the
EU stands set to join the European Convention on Human rights with the entry into force
of Protocol  of the Convention in June .
e result has been that for  years, from  to , the ECJ’s assertion that EU
law applied to individuals and protected their fundamental rights stood uncontested and
even expanded. Part of the explanation lies in the strategy of using human rights
protections to gain support for the potentially more contentious doctrine of supremacy.
Despite the Opinion in  about the EU’s inability to conclude agreements about human
rights, the Court still found that EU law protected fundamental rights. Not until December
 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty did the Treaties themselves contain any
language relating to fundamental rights.
⁴¹see C-/ Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich ()
ECR I-.
⁴²Opinion / on Accession by the Community to the ECHR () ECR I-.
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2.2 Judicial Independence and the ECJ
e ECJ has themeans, through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy that it has
asserted for itself, and the opportunity, through the stream of cases from private litigants
pressing the boundary of European law, to act independently of the member states’ policy
preferences with respect to integration. It also has a high degree of institutional
independence, which would provide cover for just this type of behavioral independence.
But means, opportunity, and cover still do not imply amotive for the Court to push for a
federal Europe.
Using the preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ partnered with national courts to
acquire the opportunity to pursue an independent pro-integration agenda. At the same
time, it developed the means by which it would be able to do so, through the doctrines of
direct effect and supremacy of EU Treaties, Regulations, and Directives. e expressed
discontent, from time to time, of one or more member state governments at losing
judgments, is oen taken as evidence of the ECJ’s rogue federalism (Alter, ).
On the other hand, the same evidence supports the claim that the ECJ has navigated
carefully the demands of member-state principals. For most of its existence, the ECJ lacked
any kind of enforcement mechanism, though now under some circumstances it can levy
fines for failure to comply with judgments. Viewed this way, the Court has sought to
maximize compliance with judgments, and therefore has refrained from issuing judgments
that would likely face noncompliance on the part of member states. In Garrett’s ()
analysis, this means more oen than not pushing integration exactly as far France and
Germany were likely to comply with. e empirical fact that member states comply with
ECJ judgments, and that the ECJ has made some daring judgments and earned compliance,
variously measured, despite some member state governments’ grousing, does not establish
independent unwanted action on the part of the court. Although Garrett and some
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subsequent work such as Kilroy () find only limited support for deference to some
member states, it is hardly definitive; still, it does not account for judges’ behavior but only
aggregate outcomes. ere is a more general argument about constraints, noncompliance,
and override, in such work as Stone Sweet and Brunell (), who argue that the Court
follows the Commission more than member states, as well as Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla
(), who find some conditional support for member state influence in observations.
In a largely distinct literature on the power and autonomy of constitutional courts,
independence is usually considered a function of appointment length (though lifetime
appointments are rare) and difficulty of removal. Helmke () has considered other
potential limits on independence as well, such as judges’ salaries or resources available to
the court.
“Independence” is a normatively freighted word, especially when applied to a court. It
merits a brief aside to discuss judicial independence, delegation, and discretion to clarify
their different meanings and implications. In the view of Weiler (), and Stone Sweet
(), and Rasmussen (), and to a lesser extent Burley and Mattli () and Mattli
and Slaughter () independence for the ECJ equals its deliberate pursuit of “normative
supranationalism” (Weiler, , ), rooted in “Court’s strong and bold pro-Community
policy preference” (Rasmussen, , ). In this view, which contrasts with how scholars
usually think about judicial independence and the rule of law, the ECJ’s independence
from political constraints is a bad thing, because it allows the Court to pursue a rogue
agenda of more integration than member state governments agree to.
Used in the negative sense just described, an “independent” Court of Justice fits in the
rationalist principal-agent framework in the following way. e member states have
“delegated upward” to the supranational EU institutions some of their powers (Pollack,
, , , ). ey have placed some constraints on the delegated institutions –
the Commission, the Court, and the Parliament, most especially the latter (Vaubel, ;
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Wonka, ; Franchino, ; Hug, ; Pollack, ; atcher and Stone Sweet, ;
atcher and Sweet, ; Tallberg, ; Pollack, ; Doring, ). e level of
discretion allowed to the “agents” is related to the level of agreement over policy between
principals and agents, and the amount of uncertainty about those policy preferences
(Huber and Shipan, ; Epstein and O’Halloran, ). Specifically with respect to
government-judicial interactions, “whether the government has the means to bend the
judiciary to its will depends… on variables such as the ability of the political branches to
agree among themselves on how to deter or upend judicial rulings” (Helmke and
Rosenbluth, , ). e problem is compounded in the EU where it is not just just an
intragovernment institutional coordination problem, but a intergovernmental
coordination problem to jointly defy the ECJ, legislate in response, or in the extreme revise
the Treaties (Garrett and Weingast, ; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla, ).
e portrayal of the Court’s independent push for integration is further complicated by
recent evidence that judges respond to common stimuli that provide signals either about
the likelihood of (non)compliance. In Garrett (), it is the anticipation of the
preferences of “large member states,” and in Dehousse () the “political climate” overall
being more or less favorable to integration that prompts the judges (uniformly) to adapt
their preference for integration into more tailored judgments. Kilroy () considers
specific “coalitions” of parties among observations and interventions in a similar manner.
In Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla (), judges uniformly respond to the perceived threat
of noncompliance or override, as indicated by observations and interventions.
e fact that the Court of Justice has made the transformative judgments discussed
above does not, in and of itself, indicate a federalist motive, only that it developed the
means by which it would be able to shape EU law. e variation of member states’
acceptance of direct effect and supremacy, examined at length in Slaughter, Stone Sweet,
and Weiler (), does not indicate an agency amok. One must remember that the ECJ
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also has the means to reinforce provisions of EU law that member states like. Indeed the
opportunities for ECJ independence multiplied as national courts became more aware of
their own power under the preliminary reference provision. e Court’s willingness to
broadly expand the scope of EU law in a number of policy domains is also not enough to
show that the court has behaved “independently” or more precisely, inconsistently with the
preferences of the member state governments.
It is necessary to consider what judges’ behavioral independence would imply. To do
this, we must consider what “dependent” behavior would look like, and how we could tell
the one from the other. Even if we grant that the decisions of the Court have advanced
integration, which much evidence supports, that does not establish independence. Both
overall and in many specific policy areas, the Commission position predicts the Court
decision over  of the time. To consider dependence or independence more closely,
then, we have to consider the member state governments’ preferences and their
institutional capacity to constrain the Court, and crucially the policy preferences of the
judges of the Court. For judges to evince independent behavior consistent with the
common claim in the literature, they would have to be both unconstrained and have
divergent policy preferences from member states. Agreeing with the Commission does not
establish that point; the Commission itself is appointed by member states. Alone,
agreement with the Commission does not establish any relationship with member states’
preferences.
e normative basis for institutional insulation is to ensure that the Court does not
face (or at least respond to) pressure to rule in a particular way. In other words, insulation
or cover seeks to remove the possibility of inducing a change between the true policy
preferences of judges and their revealed preferences or behavior. erefore, selection
should matter even more to member states, and they should want to choose ECJ members
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with preferences reflective of their own – even more so because of the institution’s
insulation.
Empirical claims of the ECJ’s independent assertion of a pro-integration agenda are
based on variously convincing, but incomplete, circumstantial evidence of the means and
opportunity to defy member state interests. ey are incomplete because in addition, pace
Huber and Shipan (), members of the Court would also have to have an underlying
motivation to pursue integration at the expense of national sovereignty. is motivation
takes the form of the underlying policy preferences of the judges at the ECJ. In other
words, they must individually have the “strong and bold pro-Community policy
preference” Rasmussen () spoke of. is is a strong claim about the preferences of
judges. Specifically in the EU context, the means, opportunity, and cover still do not
provide a basis for believing that members of the ECJ should all develop homogenous
pro-integration preferences. So it is interesting to note that the bulk of the literature on the
developing of EU law by the ECJ indicates that the court has ruled not only discordantly
with the wishes of the member states, but in a federalist direction.
e logical fallacy here is that the cover provided by the institution implies the
behavioral independence of the judges. Even if this were true – if judges’ behavior were
completely unconstrained and independent – it does not imply anything about the
underlying preferences of the judges. Most emphatically, it does not imply a
Euro-federalist agenda.
ere is no reason to expect that national governments deliberately appoint judges that
have this character. ere is simply no reason to assume that a Europe-wary government
would appoint a federalist Judge to the ECJ. Likewise, it is probable that member state
governments somewhat favorably inclined toward Europe have appointed judges that
similarly favor more integration rather than less. us, depending on the composition of
the court, it is more than plausible that “independent” decisions actually reflect the opinion
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of a majority of judges and, by imperfect proxy, a majority of member state governments
that appointed them. e authors that engage the question of motivation beyond a legalist
perspective uniformly assert that judges are uniformly pro-integration, when in fact only a
majority need be so to result in the observed judgments. us, an alternative claim is that
the court is acting within its discretion and has not been curtailed because the preferences
of the judges are not at odds with those of the member states.
e institutional insulation of the court (not to be called home mid-term, renewable
terms of fixed length, and collegial decisions) does not imply a motive for individual
judicial rulings. It simply provides cover, which Euroskeptics as well as Europhiles on the
court can avail themselves. Recognizing this, we are confronted with the difficult question
of what motivates judges. e most common claim is that that they seek greater powers for
the supranational institutions (Rasmussen, , ; Hartley, ; Weiler, ).
Hartley puts it succinctly:
“One of the distinctive characteristics of the European Court is the extent to
which its decision-making is based on policy. By policy is meant the values
and attitudes of the judges – the objectives they wish to promote. e policies
of the European Court are basically the following: ) strengthening the
Community (and especially the federal elements in it); ) increasing the scope
and effectiveness of Community law; ) enlarging the powers of Community
law. ey may be summed up in one phrase: the promotion of European
integration” (Hartley, , ).
2.2.1 Appointment and Judicial Motivations
e current evidence and theoretical treatment does not give us any evidence about what
motivates the Judges of the European Court of Justice. e only suggestion to be found for
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this motivation is that judges essentially adopt the prevailing preferences (which is in favor
of integraiton) of sitting members of the court and abandon any they previously held in the
interest of collegiality (Edward, ; Mancini and Keeling, a). But these same
authors, both former judges, both acknowledge “diverse” underlying preferences, and
Mancini and Keeling (b) even suggests their systematic correlation with features of the
appointing governments, in particular the le-right ideological outlook of governments.
e selection process varies considerably, but there are institutional factors to the selection
process that should give some idea of judges’ underlying motivations – at any rate, a
picture of these motivations more theoretically sound than endemic Euro-federalism.
e selection process for appointment to the Court promotes judges who share some
or all of the political and national interests of the appointing national government. e
EEC Treaty and subsequent revisions never included any provision for judges to represent
national governments. e Treaty simply stated that a certain number of judges (originally,
seven) would be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States
for six-year renewable terms. e Treaty also stipulated that the judges must be chosen
from among “persons of indisputable independence who fulfill the conditions required for
the holding of the highest judicial office in their respective countries or who are lawyers of
a recognized competence” (EEC Treaty Article  ()). In practice, however, each
Member State proposes one judge and these choices have never been overturned by the
other Member States.⁴³
Before the revised  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“Lisbon
Treaty”), the number simply corresponded to the number of member states, with
appointment by “common accord” which resulted in de facto deference to each member
state’s government in appointment. e Lisbon treaty reform formally established
⁴³In periods with an even number of Member States, the Court included an extra judge to ensure an odd
number. at additional member was agreed by common consent of the Member States.
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appointment by member states but now in consultation with an advisory panel including
members of the ECJ, the Council, and the European Parliament. During the Constitutional
treaty draing process, the European Parliament sought an even more active role, perhaps
even an appointment of its own; in the end, the opinion of the advisory panel is
non-binding on the governments making appointments in a given year.
According to some scholars, this has injected some political considerations into the
recruitment process (e.g. Dehousse, , ).⁴⁴ For one, the member-state governments,
who have policy and electoral goals that might be affected by decisions by the Court, have
an incentive to select judges who, in addition to meeting the standards of the Treaty, also
share their policy goals and views on EU law. In addition, the opportunity for
re-appointment each six years provides national governments with the opportunity to
replace judges. is may be attractive to a government when it considers re-appointment
of a judge that was appointed originally under a different government. It may also serve as
a means by which a government can punish/reward a judge for the decisions of the Court.
It is important to recall that the votes of individual judges are not published, so
Member States cannot monitor the voting behavior of its judges. Furthermore, explicit
evidence of governments exerting pressure on judges is rare. Dehousse (, ) notes
the Judge Zuleeg, appointed by the West German government, felt pressure fromWest
German Chancellor Kohl of ECJ rulings regarding social security for migrant workers in
. us, the appointment process provides some incentives for judges to pay attention
to the preferences regarding EU law of Member State governments, but admittedly a
national government cannot easily monitor the behavior of its judge.
However, the appointment process can affect the preferences of judges in another way.
Even if governments cannot monitor and punish judges for their voting behavior, they can
⁴⁴Unfortunately, we know very little about the details of the selection process by national governments. See
Brown and Kennedy () for some related discussion.
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choose judges who share their preferences over the interpretation of EU law and the policy
consequences of Court decisions. One might counter this point by noting that
governments are not, in practice, free to choose anyone they please. Governments have
followed at least the spirit of the Treaty and limited their appointments to lawyers or judges
who have served or are eligible for selection to the highest judicial office in their country.
is includes judges on constitutional courts and lawyers/academics with the potential to
do so. ese candidates are hardly typical party politicians, practiced in following
government directions, or legislators.
While this is true, the recent history of EU national governments in selecting members
of constitutional courts points in the direction of politicized ECJ judges. National
governments, or their party members in the legislatures, generally have the opportunity to
select members of constitutional courts in the EU Member States. Evidence from the
behavior of judges on constitutional courts indicates that national governments are able to
use these appointments to place judges who share their political leanings on the bench.
Since these are the same national governments who appoint judges to the ECJ, it seems
reasonable to assume they also select judges for the ECJ that share their political goals
regarding EU law and meet the qualifications demanded by the Treaty. ⁴⁵ Indeed, it would
be odd to assume that governing officials lose their interest in and aptitude for selecting
like-minded judges when the appointment is to the ECJ.
In addition, evidence from the behavior of constitutional courts indicates that once
appointed to the bench, these judges oen behave as “legislators”, using their rulings to
affect public policy outcomes in the ideological direction of their appointing government
(Stone Sweet ). e same pool of candidates that staff constitutional courts with such
policy-conscious judges is also the pool from which the ECJ judges are drawn (Volcansek,
⁴⁵On the appointment of members to national constitutional courts, see Stone Sweet (). e role of the
national government varies from country to country, but the legislative parties that form governments usually
play a central role in the selection of judges.
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Figure .: Ideology of appointing governments of ECJ judges over time byweighted cabinet
average.
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; Stone Sweet, ). Consequently, we should expect ECJ judges to have policy
preferences and to understand how to write decisions that reflect them.
Finally, there is very good reason to think the policy preferences of the appointing
governments vary, sometimes dramatically, over time and across countries. Figure .
plots each judge as a point based on the le-right position of the government making the
appointment. Government positions are taken from Kim and Fording (), in which
ideology is estimated from party manifesto data and weighted by the composition of

governments. A line traces the locally weighted average, and exhibits a pronounced
conservative trend over time.
e notion that judges are appointed on the basis of preferences similar to their
appointing governments is a common theme in scholarship of the ECJ. It is acknowledged
explicitly by judges at the court itself:
“In one sense the Court is highly representative. Its composition reflects
Europe’s diversity with great precision and the appointment of its members by
the common accord of the governments contributes to making it politically
balanced. Because each Judge’s term of office expires aer six years and
because governments change with equal or greater regularity in most Member
States, it is in fact likely that at any given time roughly half the members of the
Court will have been nominated by a conservative administration and roughly
half by a socialist or liberal one” (Mancini, , , emphasis mine).
Given a choice of whether to appoint a judge or allow the seat to be filled by another
country (perhaps one with more integrationist preferences) even recalcitrant Britain sends
a judge to the ECJ. Appointment, especially given long tenure and inability to recall judges,
is an imperfect means of control. Still, it is not as Volcansek () claims, that “Europeans
have come down firmly on the side of judicial independence” when it comes to the ECJ.
Even if it cannot observe if the judge was the sole dissenter on every vote; still, it would like
to replace the judge with a more persuasive one when it has the chance.
Kenney () finds evidence that appointments to the ECJ are handled differently
across member states. Some, such as the Netherlands, tend to appoint professors who have
studied European law and are known, generally, to have a more pro-integration stance.
Only in the case of Germany does she find overt politicization of the role; a referendaire
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she interviews says he could not hope to be a judge because he didn’t have a party card.
Her study omits, however, any mention of actual court decisions.
Beach momentarily considers and dismisses the possibility that appointment is a
means of “control” of the ECJ, concluding that “matters of nationality and past experience
do not significantly affect the way judges behave in the Court.” He goes on to discount
evidence the Germany appoints judges on a political basis: “It is however common practice
for Germany to not re-appoint its judges, as the post of ECJ judge is part of a larger internal
political game, where the major German political parties divide senior judicial posts
between themselves” (Beach, , ). Appointment, especially given long tenure and
inability to recall judges, is at best an imperfect means of control. Still, this is not a reason
to conclude, as does Volcansek (), that “Europeans have come down firmly on the side
of judicial independence” when it comes to the ECJ. In other words, there is still no
evidence that judges should have themotive of divergent preferences from their appointing
member state governments.
A seemingly simple question – does a new government prefer to appoint a new judge
whenever it has the opportunity – has no simple answers.⁴⁶ On one hand, a seat at the ECJ
could be a reward the winning party or coalition can deliver. Many judges have served
national-level non-judicial (appointive) posts, where they could demonstrate their fealty to
national interest. But judges’ terms are staggered, and elections are not at regular intervals,
so a government does not know if it is going to be able to appoint a judge. A newly elected
government may have to appoint a judge soon into its term, which may in fact drive
reappointment when governments do not invest in evaluating the sitting judge’s behavior
compared to their preferences.
⁴⁶e contrast with the US Supreme Court is stark: a president always wants to appoint justices as ideolog-
ically close to himself as the Senate will confirm.
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emost comprehensive study of the members of the court to date is Kenney ().
Her archival and interview research reveals the greatest extant detail on who the judges of
the ECJ were and are and how they got there – but she took these features as independent
of the court’s own activities. at is, even though she discusses the explicit politicization of
the appointment process in Germany, never does she consider monitoring activities or
reactions to Court decisions.
Table . shows the mean number of terms served by judges from each member state
from the time of its entry to ; thus the six founding member states have had more
opportunities to appoint, but even these are seen to vary considerably. Later-joining
countries, for example, Spain, and Portugal which joined at the same time have quite
distinct patterns of appointment. Portugal has consistently reappointed its judge, while the
Spanish government has appointed a new judge at each occasion.
Table .: e mean number of terms served by ECJ judges.
Country Judges Mean Terms
Belgium  .
Denmark  .
France  .
Germany  .
Greece  .
Ireland  .
Italy  .
Luxembourg  .
Netherlands  .
Portugal  .
Spain  .
United Kingdom  .

In the aggregate, the median time served is one term. A considerable number serve less
than one full term⁴⁷, and many are reappointed. Quite few are reappointed for a third term
(any duration beyond .).
e appointment process, and the pool of potential appointees, varies considerably
among the member states. It has also changed over time within member states. For
example, according to Kenney (), ECJ judges from the United Kingdom are selected
usually in consultation with the Scottish Office, because Scotland shares some of the
continent’s civil law tradition in a way that the common-law British judges might now. In
France, Plotner (, ) claims that the Conseil d’État had become dissatisfied with its
role as being the source of ECJ Advocates General, and sought to appoint a Judge instead
in . In Germany and Austria, it is typical for ECJ judgeship to be allocated like a
ministerial portfolio (Beach, ; Kenney, ). In Italy and the Netherlands, ECJ
judgeships have generally gone to academic legal scholars, rather than national-court
judges.
Figure . presents the same data as figure . on page  collapsed along the x axis, so
that instead of ordering across time, the judges are ordered by the ideology of their national
governments at the time of their initial appointment to the ECJ. If national governments
select judges that hold motivations similar to their own, judges’ own motivations can be
expected to correlate systematically with a distribution like the one shown. e widely
accepted claim that ECJ judges are uniformly pro-integration has two parts, which are not
tested and have heretofore been untestable: ) that ECJ judges’ preferences are uniform,
and ) that judges’ preferences have no systematic relationship with those of member state
governments. In graphical terms, this is to suggest that the expected distribution of judges’
motivations would be represented by points in a straight line down the right side of
⁴⁷I do not account for end-truncation in this discussion. Indeed some of the less-than-one durations (and
others) are currently sitting judges.
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Figure .: Ideology of governments at the time of initial appointment of ECJ judges, using
party ideology estimates weighted by cabinet seats (Kim and Fording, ).
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figure .. Scholars have by and large accepted both of these claims without evidence. To
reiterate, this is an empirical claim about individual judges. To date, nearly all research on
the Court of Justice has had to assume that judges are homogenous and respond
uniformly; moreover, it has been impossible to test claims about individuals, either their
predispositions or contextual behavior. If one wants to evaluate whether and to what extent
judges’ behavior is independent of member state preferences this is what we need to know.
2.2.2 Conclusion: Sources of Diversity of Judicial Motivations
In conclusion, two features of the methods of appointment to the ECJ suggest potential
differences in the goals, preferences, and motivations of judges. e first is of course

cross-national variation resulting from different approaches to appointment and renewal
or non-renewal. e second is, particularly for those countries that are more likely to make
new appointments aer each six-year term, that variations in the ideologies of national
governments would plausibly affect the types of judges they select. It is at least plausible
that governments would seek to appoint judges that share their preferences about the
appropriate amount of government involvement in economic and social matters, or the
appropriate level of government (i.e., national or European). It follows that one should
expect judges of the Court of Justice to have a diversity of opinion – not a uniform
pro-integration stance. Nevertheless, the claim that the Court has pushed for more
integration and more supranational authority rests on this assumption of uniform
pro-integration preferences of judges. It has been impossible, because of collective
ostensibly unanimous decisions, to test any empirical claims about ECJ judges’ individual
preferences and their effect on case outcomes. However, the organization of the court, in
particular its system of Chambers, provides an indirect way to observe how outcomes vary
from the changing composition of Chambers. In the next section, I discuss the
development of the chambers system, which enables the court to handle a massive
case-load especially of preliminary references, and also enables my novel empirical
application.
e selection process leads to two predictions about what sorts of concerns will define
the preferences of judges in interpreting EU law. First, one would expect judges to share
the policy preferences on the socio-economic issues relevant to the appointing
government. Depending on the partisan make-up of government across the EU, this may
vary across Judges more in some periods than others. Second, one would expect judges to
be sympathetic (relative to the other judges) to their national government’s position when
it is party to a proceeding.
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I will revisit this issue and derive specific empirical implications that will be tested with
observed data from the Court of Justice in Chapter . Because a wide variety of cases are
heard by different combinations of judges, it may be possible to model the different judges’
predispositions. To understand the modeling implications, it is first necessary to explain
the organizational innovation of the Court of Justice that provides leverage, indirectly, on
the observation of case-level variation arising from individual-level variation.
2.3 Empirical Opportunity: the System of Chambers
e actual practice of the Court of Justice provides a rare opportunity to test whether its
judges in fact have a uniform motive to promote integration. e system of Chambers,
described below, reveals patterns in decision-making that vary not only only with known
features of cases, but with the composition of the Chamber hearing the case. To date, all
analyses of the court have had to assume that all judges hold uniform preferences
(generally assumed to be pro-integration), and that they all respond to signals and
incentives uniformly. e variation in Chambers also undermines theories that would take
the Court median as a measure of the ECJ’s preferences, because each chamber median
must be considered.
I develop a research design to infer the dispositions of individual judges. I also provide
a means for individual judges in a chamber to respond non-uniformly and test for the first
time whether judges evince any greater sympathy for their own governments’ observations
in preliminary references. No study to date has considered the distribution of preferences
of ECJ judges, or the potential for selective rather than uniform departure from underlying
preferences.
Chambers or subsets of collegial judges – those that do not make public their internal
disagreements through either votes or published dissents from decisions – enable a body of
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judges to divide work among its members. is increases efficiency, and may bolster the
reputation and legitimacy of the court as a whole by shielding individual judges from
public scrutiny. However, this shield depends on an assumption of uniformity among
chambers, and more importantly, among judges. As shown above, however, judges should
be expected to have different underlying preferences that vary systematically with other
known features, in particular who appointed them.
e system of chambers at the Court of Justice has evolved over time from an
innovation in the Rules of Procedure and some codification in the Treaties back to greater
latitude for the Court to self-regulate. Although the membership was ostensibly fixed for
two to three years at a time, enlargements, retirements, and replacements create more
variation even among older cases than the two-year duration would suggest.
Given that ECJ decisions now affect policy in a broad array of areas, it is surprising that
so little research has addressed how the ECJ decides cases. In particular, I am aware of no
research that has systematically described or examined the internal organization of the
Court or that has explored the consequences of that organization for legal outcomes.⁴⁸
Standard descriptive treatments of the Court usually mention briefly that the Court oen
assigns cases to subsets of judges, called Chambers, who rule on the case. However, studies
of ECJ rulings or the politics of the Court rarely even mention this feature of
decision-making. is is puzzling for two reasons. First, almost all rulings by the ECJ are
made by a subset of judges, not the full court. Since , only three cases have been heard
⁴⁸One exception is Naômé (), who considers two possible effects of enlargement on the jurisprudence
of the Court. First, she worries that “different compositions of the Grand Chamber could lead to… different
majorities in similar cases; the presence of the presidents (of the Court and of the chambers of five) is not a
guarantee of consistency: they do not have the majority in the Grand Chamber and, in any event, they are not
expected to agree on all points of law” (). Second, she considers the chamber assignments of new member
states aer the  enlargement: “In January , the judges of the new member states were thus spread
evenly in the four chambers of five, three of them belonging to each chamber. e rules on the appointment of
the judges sitting in a casemean that judges fromnewmember states could form amajority” in both Chambers
of Five and potentially the Grand Chamber (Naômé, , –).
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by the full court; in recent years only about  have been heard by the “grand chamber”
of  judges. us, assignment to chambers is very common.
Second, both past research on the use of panels and a realistic consideration of the
composition of the ECJ suggest the use of chambers should influence the rulings of the
Court. For example, evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court of
South Africa, and the Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States indicates that the
distribution of cases among subsets (panels) of judges can have significant effects on
judicial outcomes (Atkins and Zavoina, ; Heard, ; Hausegger and Haynie, ;
Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, ; Sunstein et al., ; Peresie, ; Kastellec, ).
e key point from these studies is that, when the judges on a bench differ in their views
on a case, the final outcome can change solely as a result of the composition of panel.
It seems at least plausible that the composition of ECJ chambers might also affect its
judgments systematically; i.e., that outcomes of the same case could counterfactually have
been different if heard by a different chamber. When cases are assigned to different subsets
of judges, there is the opportunity for this assignment to affect the outcome of the case.
Indeed, Advocate General Francis Jacobs has expressed concern about the very possibility.
According to Andenas (, fn ), Jacobs stated that the three-judge chamber “does not
always lead to a consistent practice,” and predicted that the five-judge chamber will likely
become standard practice, with the more important cases being heard by the full Court.
“Few of our cases are really so trivial,” Jacobs has remarked, “that they can really… be
entrusted to a three-judge chamber.”⁴⁹ Aer all, the studies cited above involve judges from
the same national legal system. In contrast, ECJ judges have varying levels of experience
with EU law, specific areas of domestic law, and even the working languages of the Court.
⁴⁹In  the United Kingdom expressed concern that, due to variation in composition, different chambers
might reach contradictory judgments about similar questions (Due, ). us, the UK government pro-
posed that all decision by chambers would be subject to appeal to the full plenary in its memorandum to the
intergovernmental conference on the Amsterdam Treaty (Due, ). is proposal was not adopted in the
Treaty.
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Moreover, they are trained in different national legal systems. us, in addition to the
typical reasons we might expect differences of opinion among judges on national courts
(e.g., varying legal philosophies), ECJ judges bring potentially important national
perspectives to the bench. ese perspectives are relevant most of all in constitutional
cases. According to Edward (, ),
“[M]any of the cases before the Court are “constitutional” in character or at
least raise points that deserve the input of a judge from each Member State and
each legal tradition. Also, where a chamber finds that a case raises points of
principle that ought to be dealt with by the plenary, there must then be a
second oral hearing and a second Opinion from the Advocate General. A year
or more may then be lost before judgment is given. ere is therefore a
tendency, at the stage of the General Meeting to maintain a case before the
plenary, or at least the petit plenum, if there is a serious risk that a chamber
would find itself unable to decide it.
In these discussions, and in the deliberations later, the role of the judge of the
country from which the case comes (the so-called “national judge”) is not to
urge on the Court a solution favorable to that Member State. Such advocacy
would almost certainly be counterproductive. But it is important that the
Court should be aware of all dimensions of the cases it has to decide. It is
therefore expected that the judge of the country from which the case comes
should draw the Court’s attention to any special features of the case of which
the Rapporteur and Advocate General may have been unaware. is may be a
significant deciding factor in determining how the case should be dealt with.”
Consequently, we might expect that the distribution of cases to Chambers would also have
an important influence on ECJ rulings.
With scant prior research on the system of Chambers, this section provides the first
comprehensive account of how the system of Chambers has developed over time and
presents systematic evidence regarding its use. In particular, I focus on the limitations
imposed by the Treaties governing the formation of the Court and the Court’s Rules of
Procedure on which types of cases can be heard in Chambers.
By the mid-s the Court was deciding many more cases in Chambers than in full
plenary. e Court had also developed a more complicated system of Chambers. In ,

Figure .: Number of judgments issued by chambers and by the full court. Source: Annual
Reports of the Court of Justice, various years.
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the Court, preparing for enlargement to thirteen members, created six Chambers: the first,
second, third and fourth chambers consisting of three judges; the first and third combining
to create the fih chamber and the second and fourth chambers combining to create the
sixth chamber.⁵⁰ And, in  the Court began to sit in a “Small Plenum” of seven judges,
which was the quorum for decisions by the full Court. e “Small Plenum” was an
innovation of the Court itself taking advantage of the quorum established in the Treaties,
and a former judge wrote shortly aer that “the expressions grand and petit plenum have
been coined by the Court itself and are not to be found in any text” (Mancini, , ).
Effectively, this allowed the Court to assign cases to a subset of judges without formally
assigning the cases to Chambers. As a result, the actual use of the full Court, including all
fieen then judges, became a rare event. By the mid-s, less than twenty per cent of
ECJ decisions were made by the full Court.
⁵⁰Because the EEC Treaty permitted only Chambers of three or five judges, the fih and sixth chambers sat
with only five of the six members of their constituent lower Chambers.
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Crucially, the chambers have never specialized into different areas of law. Micklitz
() refers to two features of assignment relating to the national origin of cases: that in
general a Judge-Rapporteur is not assigned preliminary references from his own country of
origin; and the Advocate-General is also generally from a different country of origin.
Neither of these is anywhere codified. To the contrary, although far from commonplace,
both such assignments have occurred.
e internal organization of the Court is largely ignored in scholarship and legal
commentary on the Court. We are aware of only one article on the history of the
Chambers systems and that was published before several changes in the s (Guillaume,
).⁵¹ us, before discussing how the Chambers system might affect ECJ
decision-making, we provide an over-view of the Chambers system and its historical
development. We will emphasize two lines of change in this system. First, the system has
increased in complexity in terms of the number of chambers and therefore the diversity of
the sets of judges that might decide a case. Second, the types of cases heard by chambers
have increased dramatically over times. is is true both in terms of the legal basis of
appeal to the Court and in terms of issue areas.
While essentially no cases of legal import could be assigned to Chambers at the origin
of the EEC, the Court now has the prerogative of assigning any case to Chambers.
Tables . and . summarize chronologically the changes in the rules governing the
Court’s organization. Table . describes relevant changes in the Treaties and their
protocols that granted discretion to the Court to alter the Chambers system. Table .
chronicles the amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court that define the
Chambers system.
⁵¹Plendar () provides a thorough review of the Chambers system circa  and compares it with the
system at the International Court of Justice. But this comparison does not describe the historical development
of the system at the ECJ or examine its consequences for ECJ rulings.
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e Rome Treaty creating the European Economic Community created the European
Court of Justice and permitted it to sit in Chambers. Specifically, the Court, then
composed of seven judges, was allowed to create Chambers composed of three or five
judges.⁵² In response to the Treaty, the Court established two Chambers of three judges
that heard only cases regarding Community personnel.⁵³ Aer the completion of the
written procedure, the reporting judge for that case recommended the case be assigned to a
specific chamber or to the full Court, who then decided its assignment. But the Treaty did
not permit the Chambers to hear cases submitted to it by a Member State or by one of the
institutions of the Community and cases involving preliminary references. is le only
staff and personnel cases to be decided in chambers.
2.3.1 Expansion of the scope of cases assigned to chambers
eMember States modified Article  of the EEC Treaty in  to broaden slightly the
use of Chambers. e revised Treaty allowed the Court to hear preliminary reference
requests in Chambers so long as the Rules of Procedure of the Court permitted. Very
shortly thereaer, the Court adapted its Rules of Procedure. e stated motivation for
these changes was “the considerable increase in the number of cases brought before the
Court of Justice.”⁵⁴ e rules were modified to allow Chambers to hear preliminary
reference cases that were of “an essentially technical nature or concern matters for which
there is already an established body of law.”⁵⁵ But, such a case could still require a plenary
decision if a member state or a Community institution submitted a written observation on
⁵²Article  EEC
⁵³Article , Rules of Procedure, ; Brown and Kennedy : 
⁵⁴Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 
September . OJ L : .
⁵⁵See Official Journal of the European Communities, December, , , /, and Rules of Procedure of
the Court of Justice, , Article  (Brussels: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities).

the case and did not consent in that observation to permit a ruling from a chamber.⁵⁶ e
Court heard the first such case in Chambers in  (Brown and Kennedy, , ).
In , the Court amended its rules once more to allow a much broader set of cases to
be assigned to Chambers. e Court allowed Chambers to hear any case except
infringements proceedings (Article  EC) provided no relevant Member State or
Community institution objected. Furthermore, the  reform modified the exception
for cases involving Member States. e new rules stated that if either a Member State or a
Community institution that is party to a proceeding wanted the case heard by the full
Court, it would need to make such a request. In other words, the default was now that a
case could be assigned to Chambers, with the burden on the Member State or Community
institution to request the case to the full Court.
To provide a sense of how these reforms altered the work of the Court, one can
compare the distribution of the Court’s decisions in years on either side of this latest
reform:  and .⁵⁷ In , the Court decided  cases, with the full Court ruling
on  cases ( direct actions;  preliminary rulings). e chambers ruled on  cases,
comprised of  preliminary rulings, and  staff cases. In , this Court decided 
cases. Chambers ruled on  of these, including  direct actions and  preliminary
rulings. us, the chambers significantly increased their share of ECJ rulings (from  to
) and heard cases in a broad range of EU policy domains.
is trend continued. As Figure . indicates, by the mid-s the Court was
deciding many more cases in Chambers than in full plenary. e Court had also developed
a more complicated system of Chambers. In , the Court, preparing for enlargement to
twelve members, created six Chambers: the first, second, third and fourth chambers
consisting of three judges; the first and third combined to create the fih chamber and the
⁵⁶Article (),  ROP.
⁵⁷Synopsis of the Work of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in . Luxembourg, .
Page .
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second and fourth chambers combined to create the sixth chamber.⁵⁸ And, in  the
Court began to sit in a “Small Plenum” of seven judges, which was the quorum for
decisions by the full Court. Effectively, this allowed the Court to assign cases to a subset of
judges without formally assigning the cases to Chambers. e Nice Treaty replaced the
Small Plenum with the Grand Chamber, which now consists of  judges. As a result, the
actual use of the full Court of fieen judges became a rare event. By the mid-s, less
than twenty per cent of ECJ decisions were made by the full Court. Moreover, the “full”
Court did not usually include all judges. For example, the quorum was  judges with the
-judge Court and was raised to  for the current Court of .
e Court’s revisions of its rules of procedure in  further broadened the latitude of
the Court to assign cases to Chambers. Except when a Community institution or a
Member State involved with a case expressly requested the case be heard by the full Court,
the Court had complete discretion as to which subset of judges would decide the case. is
exception was removed in , with the Nice Treaty. e Treaty leaves the assignment of
cases to Chambers completely at the discretion of the Court’s rules of procedure. e
Treaty also formally recognized the use of the Small Plenum, which the Court had used
prior to that point but was not found in any of the treaties.⁵⁹
In sum, by the late s over half of the Court’s decisions came from subsets of judges,
sitting in Chambers. From that point on, the Court decided the bulk of its cases in
Chambers. In addition, by the early s the Court had the prerogative of assigning any
case to Chambers, absent a request from a Member State or Community institution to have
the case heard in plenary. us, the internal organization of the Court into Chambers
certainly allows for a large number of ECJ cases brought under a variety of legal bases to be
decided by only subsets of judges sitting in Chambers.
⁵⁸Because the EEC Treaty permitted only Chambers of three or five judges, the fih and sixth chambers sat
with only five of the six members of their constituent lower Chambers.
⁵⁹see Mancini (, ).
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Table .: Rules of Procedure of the Court Relevant to Use of Chambers
Date Formal Number
& Size
Actual Number &
Size
Scope of Case Assignment to Chambers
⁶⁰
 chambers of   chambers of  no specific mention; see Treaty provisions in Table 
⁶¹  chambers  chambers of  () Cases referred for a preliminary ruling under arti-
clemay be assigned by theCourt to Chambers. is
provision shall apply to cases which are of an essentially
technical nature or concern matters for which there is
already an established body of case law.
() A casemay not be so assigned if aMember State has
exercised its right to submit a statement of case or writ-
ten observations, unless the state concerned has sig-
nified that it has no objection, or if an institution ex-
pressly requests in its observations that the case be de-
cided in plenary session.
⁶² In accordance
with second
paragraph of 
EEC
 chambers of  () e Court may assign to a chamber any reference
for a preliminary ruling or any action instituted under
articles , , , , and , in so far as the dif-
ficulty or the importance of the case or particular cir-
cumstances are not such as to require that the Court
decide in plenary session.
() A case may not be so assigned if a Member State or
an institution of the Communities, being a party to the
proceedings, has requested that the case be decided in
plenary session.

Date Formal Number
& Size
Actual Number &
Size
Scope of Case Assignment to Chambers
  chambers of 
 chamber of  (
decide)
 chamber of 
  chambers of 
 chambers of 
  chambers of  (
decide)
 chambers of  (
decide)
 chambers of 
()e Court may assign any case before it to a Cham-
ber insofar as the difficulty of the case or particular cir-
cumstances are not such as to require that the Court
decide it in plenary session. () same.
 grand chamber of

chambers of  and
 in accordance
with article  of
the Statute
grand chamber of

 chambers of 
 chambers of 
a case may not be assigned to a Chamber of five or
three judges if a Member State or an institution of the
Communities, being a party to the proceedings, has re-
quested that the case be decided by the Grand Cham-
ber.
  chambers of 
 chambers of 
Grand Chamber
of 
Each five-judge chamber consists of eight judges and
each three-judge chamber of seven judges, who sit in
rotation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Rules of Procedure. It should also be noted that the
three Presidents of the five-judge Chambers do not be-
long to a three-judge Chamber.
  chambers of 
 chambers of 
Grand Chamber
Each five-judge chamber is composed of six judges, and
each three-judge chamber of five judges, who sit in ro-
tation in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Rules of Procedure
⁶³ Full court;
Grand chamber of
; chambers of 
or 
 chambers of 
 chambers of 
Grand Chamber
Member-state or Institution, that is party (or intervener
or submitted written observations) to the case, can re-
quest grand chamber.
According to Statute , the Court will hear some cases
in Full Court.
Source: Annual Report on the Activities of the European Communities, various years; Rules of Procedure the
Court of Justice, various years.

⁶⁰Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of  March . OJEC
.., No Special Edition -, p.. Article .
⁶¹Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of  December , OJEC
.., p.. Articles , .
⁶²Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 
September , OJEC .., pp., -. Articles .
⁶³Current Rules of Procedure.
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Table .: Treaty Constraints on the Composition of the Court and the use of Chambers.
Date Article Provisions for size of Chambers Limits on use of Chambers

(EEC
Treaty)
 “It may, however, set up
chambers, each consisting
of three and five judges…”
“e Court of Justice shall, however, always
sit in plenary session in order to hear cases
submitted to it by a Member State or by one
of the institutions of the Community or to
deal with preliminary questions submitted
to it pursuant to Article .”
  Change due to accession
and request by the ECJ
“Whenever the Court of Justice hears cases
brought before it by a Member State or by
one of the institutions of the Community or,
to the extent that the chambers of the court
do not have the requisite jurisdiction un-
der the Rules of Procedure, has to give pre-
liminary rulings on question submitted to it
pursuant toArticle , it shall sit in plenary
session.”
 
 Statue,
EEC
Proto-
col
quorum of 
  Same as before,  and 
judges
“eCourt of Justice shall sit in plenary ses-
sion when a Member State or a Community
institution that is party to the proceedings
so requests.”
 
 Article

(Ams-
terdam
Treaty)
“It may… form chambers
each consisting of three,
five, or seven judges…”

Date Article Provisions for size of Chambers Limits on use of Chambers

&

(comes
into
force
on
Feb ,

Nice
Treaty
Proto-
col,
statute
article
; OJ
C;
//
Same as below except grand
chamber is 
e exceptions w.r.t. commissioners and
ombudsman: article (), (), ,
 () EC Treaty
 Statute,
,
OJ 
//
Same as below Same as below
 Statute
of
court
of
justice,
article
; OJ
L 
//
Full court only for the rare exceptions
re. ombudsman and commissioners;
grand chamber at request of institution or
member-state
Source: Annual Report on the Activities of the European Communities, various years; Rules of Procedure the
Court of Justice, various years.
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2.4 Conclusion: Implication of Heterogeneous Preferences at
the ECJ
e European Court of Justice, originally conceived as an international intergovernmental
dispute resolution body, has evolved into the de facto constitutional court of the European
Union. Largely through its own assertions, it has themeans to exercise judicial review,
striking national laws that it finds incompatible with European law. e “supremacy” of
European law over national law is the main source of authority of the Court of Justice in
this constitutional way.
e means of judicial review would not be enough to enable the Court to press for
integration over objections of member states, however. It would also require the
opportunity to hear cases that could give rise to interpretations that expand EU-level
competence. e combination of the doctrine of direct effect, and the Treaties’ provision
for national courts to make references for preliminary rulings provide the ECJ the
opportunity to issue judgments potentially expanding the scope of EU law. Unlike
infringement actions or actions for annulment, this source of cases is not subject to the
control of either the Commission or the member state governments. Because private
litigants have incentives to seek interpretations of EU law that give them particular
advantages, preliminary references are even more likely to challenge national laws and
invite the ECJ to strike them in favor of EU Treaty Articles, Regulations, or Directives.
e ECJ also enjoys considerable institutional insulation or cover under which it might
advance a federalist agenda. Judges are shielded from individual scrutiny by fixed
renewable terms of office (not subject to recall), and their decisions are all ostensibly
unanimous. No dissenting opinions about particular cases have ever been revealed, either
in extended reasoning or simple individual voting details. e Court is clear that
disagreements do arise in the secret deliberations, and that final decisions are made by

majority rule. To date no theoretical or empirical work has addressed the existence of this
heterogeneity of opinion in outcomes, much less its sources, because of the Court’s
institutional cover.
If we believe that disagreements do occur between judges voting on a case, then we
must confront the fact that judges bring to bear their individual motivations when
deciding cases. Furthermore we must accept that although surely they share a common
respect for the law, they must differ along a number of other dimensions that give rise to
differences of interpretation.
Given that the court has the means, opportunity, and institutional cover to pursue a
federalist agenda. In order to believe that the Court has acted “independently” at odds
with the wishes of the member states, it is necessary to believe that the judges also possess
themotive to do so. It is not obvious where such a motive would come from. Indeed, given
the Court’s diverse sources of appointment, there is even greater reason to expect that the
judges would have a common, uniform preference, much less one for integration. I have
argued that it is at least plausible to expect member states in the aggregate to select judges
that have heterogeneous preferences that reflect to some degree the preferences of the
several member state governments.
e organization of the ECJ into Chambers, and the features of reorganization and
overlap of the system of chambers, provides an opportunity to indirectly observe the effects
of individual judges’ presence on some cases and not others. In the next chapter, I develop
a statistical model to look for variations that might arise if judges had heterogeneous
preferences. e Chambers of the European Court of Justice is just one stylized application
of a more general model. In the model, I connect observed case outcomes, through judge
preferences, to the known attributes of appointing governments that might give rise to the
possible heterogeneity of opinion on the bench. Given what we know about the preferences
of member states about government involvement in economic and social life, and the

appropriate level of government (i.e., national or European), we would expect systematic
differences among judges that reflect in some way the partisan differences of governments.
Given what we know about the preferences of parties in government in the member states,
it is reasonable to think that they would appoint judges that reflect their values.

Chapter 3
A Model of Individual Contributions to
Collective Decisions
Above, in Section ., I explained how the system of Chambers of the European Court of
Justice might indirectly reveal the effects of individual judges’ dispositions, even though
judgments are collegial and ostensibly unanimous. e hope is that if enough randomness
of composition of chambers exists, if enough permutations are observed, a measure of
individual judges’ preferences might emerge consistent with the observed chamber
composition and judgments. In short, a model must consider both outcomes and
participation in chambers that produced them, and how decisions in chambers are arrived
at.
In this chapter I develop just such a model, with more general features that might be
applied to other contexts. To do this, I combine the item-response model of individual
decisionmaking with the knowledge of individuals’ selective (quasi-random) participation
on cases. en, I build an explicitly hierarchical or multilevel model that considers
predictors of the primary parameters of interest. In a further extension in section .., I
allow features of a case that apply to specifically identifiable judges, rather than the entire

chamber. But first, I review the intuition and specification of the standard item-response
model and my extensions to it. I show how the model performs at predictive accuracy and
parameter recovery in a series of simulations. In order to be clear about how the model will
(in Chapter ) be applied to observed ECJ data, I develop the specifiction below with a few
proper nouns (e.g., pro-EU) in describing the measurement strategy, so that the intuition is
clear. e results of the simulations also provide valuable guidance to scholars interested in
applying this or a similar model to decisions produced by other collegial bodies.
3.1 The Item-Response Model for Observed Votes
e item response model is a standard tool for analyzing legislative voting histories and
estimating legislators’ preferences (Jackman, ; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, ).
Packages such as Jackman’s “pscl” and Martin, Quinn, and Park’s “MCMCpack” (Martin,
Quinn, and Park, –) have made item-response models readily usable, and political
scientists have brought such methods to bear on an ever-widening variety of data. e
standard specification is consistent with a quadratic-loss utility function around a so-called
ideal point. I assume, consistent with the standard “spatial” model of voting, that each
judge’s vote depends only on the value that he attaches to the status quo or policy
alternative in a particular case.
e Bayesian framework naturally considers the ideal points as distributions rather
than point estimates. Applications in political science have oen focused on the ready
availability of standard errors for ideal points (Han, ) and the strength of Bayesian
methods with small datasets (Hagemann, ). Modeled subject parameters have been
suggested as a way to identify the model, but not generally as parameters of interest
themselves (Bafumi et al., ). rather than a scaling exercise, the advantages of including
relevant prior information are obvious. It would be foolish to ignore or discard directly

relevant information, such as possible loyalty or prospects career advancement in the
national setting, from a model of judicial behavior.
Although some earlier critiques of Bayesian methods were skeptical of the explicit
inclusion of prior knowledge for having too much influence over parameter estimates and
model fit, today it is more widely recognized that many of the assumptions underlying
classical techniques can be subsumed as “special cases” of Bayesian priors, and oen ones
that researchers would not adopt if forced to specify them in a Bayesian framework. e
choice of prior distributions and hyperprior parameters gives analysts the tools to test the
sensitivity of models to different possible alternatives. Aer all, all modeling requires
researchers to make skilled, informed modeling choices, of which prior distributions are
one. A “hierarchical” model such as the one used here allows us to encode information
about units (cases, judges) that distinguish them and therefore distinguish outcomes.
In addition, hierarchical modeling is much more straightforward in the Bayesian setup,
where parameter distributions are modeled, than in the classical one, where attention
focuses on correlation structures of “error” terms.
3.2 An Ecological Item Response for Unobserved Votes
In this section I adapt the item-response model to data where individual decisions are not
observed. I call this an ecological item response model, abbreviated -. I use the latent
parameters of the Bayesian item response model to develop a method of sampling the
person-varying ones for the relevant subset of the population involved in the decision.
Aer considering the model and sampler in general terms, I present two simulations where
known (generated) parameter values are recovered by the ecological sampler.
e outcome modeled here is whether the Court agreed with the Commission.
Agreement with the Commission is assumed to be a pro-integration decision (Stone Sweet

and Brunell, ). It is reasonable to take the Commission’s preference as at the forefront
of integration for several reasons. e Commission favors negative integration, or the
removal of national laws that hinder interstate trade, and was instrumental in constructing
the Single European Act and the common market. It also favors positive integration, the
passage of new laws at the European level (that it would dra and propose). Stone Sweet
and Brunell () concludes that “supranational institutions – especially the Commission
and the Court – operate to facilitate transnational activity, not to codify or give legal
comfort to the preferences of the dominant states” ().
e simulations span two archetypes of how courts organize chambers and divide work
among themselves: the first is a random draw of – members, and the second is a rotation
of members among stable chambers for a period of time. e random-selection model is
most like that of the US Courts of Appeals, while the latter is an approximation of the
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice until .
e parameters of interest in the model are judge ideal points and case location
parameters. Define the set of judges j = 1, 2, . . . , J. A judge’s ideal point is denoted θ j.
e usual “two-parameter” IRT model is so called because each item k has both a
location and relevance parameter (a and b respectively), and is fully described by 2 × K + J
parameters estimated from J × K data points. e relevance parameter is analogous to a
factor loading. In practice, researchers oen examine which bills have high relevance to
bolster their claims about the measured latent ideal points. (High relevance of items
relating to government involvement in the economy, for example, support the claim that
measured ideal points pertain to le–right ideology.) e outcome I model here,
pro-Commission decisions, lets me assume constant relevance b and fit a “one-parameter”
or Rasch model, estimating only location.

Formally, let k = 1, 2, . . . , K be the vector of cases (legal issues) and yk ∈ Y be the
observed decisions:
yk = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if pro-EU
0 if anti-EU
(.)
e model deals with the probability that an outcome yk is observed to be 1; in English,
a decision on a legal issue is in favor of the Commission. Formally we model
Pr(yk = 1) = Φ ( f (θ g , ak)) , (.)
which is a mapping into a probability of case parameters and judge parameters. Now we
turn to a discussion of f .
Denote the judges on a given chamber jg and all others j−g . us each case is
informative about θ g and not about θ−g . It is worth noting that in contrast to the typical
item-response framework, we observe a single outcome per case, netting K total data
points, rather than the J × K matrix of individual judge-votes.
To identify the model we must take care to restrict the number of parameters estimated
below this upper bound. e reason we have any traction on this model at all is through
the organization of judges into chambers and the rotation of members on chambers. Each
case is heard by one and only one chamber comprising a subset of judges. In a hypothetical
one-judge chamber f (⋅) would simply be the probability that judge j sided with the
Commission. But the smallest chamber is  judges, so label for each j ∈ g this probability
as ω jk :
ω jk = Φ(ak + θ j). (.)
.
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To complete the definition of f , aggregate Ω over the jg judges. e simplest
chamber-judge allocation function is the mean of ω,
∑#gj=1 ω jk ∣θ j ∈ θ g
# jg
. (.)
Because decisions in chambers are actually made by majority rule, we might have f
return the probability that themedian judge voted pro-EU. e chamber-judge weighting
function –mean, median, or other – is not a purely technical point; it relates to procedures
at the Court itself. For example, if the judge-rapporteur were somehow more strongly
influential on case outcomes than her peers, the model should make a judge’s “own” cases
contribute more heavily to the estimate of preference. Of course, as we saw in
Section .., the opportunity for such influence is very small (in the writing of the Report
for the Hearing), since the rapporteur writes the judgment even in cases where he voted in
the minority, and the most junior judge reveals his opinion first in deliberation.
In terms of implementation, we use a “participation matrix,”W where entries are  for
judges hearing a case and  for all others. e contribution of each case for those judges is
the result of a typical data-augmentation draw from a truncated normal distribution
(truncated at  from below when Y = 1 and at  from above when Y = 0), with the mean
from equation (.). All other judges on the given case are considered missing and the data
are uninformative; conversely all other cases for a given judge are missing and
uninformative. Missing data result in sampler draws from a standard normal distribution.¹
In concrete terms, the vector of case outcomes (rows k) is expanded into a matrix in
which the same outcome attaches to the participating judges (columns j).² For an
¹In fact, the sampler explores the density much more quickly (achieves “better mixing”) when the
augmented-data variance is scaled randomly. e inclusion of a randomGamma-distribution scale parameter
here is an example of “parameter expansion” which reduces the autocorrelation of Gibbs samples.
²In section .., a percentage of individual votes are revealed. In the example, if we knew the judge in col-
umn  had voted “” on the first case, the participation matrix would remain unchanged, the overall outcome
would still be “” but the entry Y1,1 = 1.
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illustrative example, consider three cases and four judges, and outcomes {0, 1, 1}′. A data
and participation matrix for these outcomes might look like this:
y =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
1
1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⇒ Y =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
W =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(.)
A chamber-median function is created as follows. First, for each case the product of
the previous iteration’s samples of judge parameters θ is multiplied by the participation
matrix, selecting only those judges present in the chamber (the probability that any draw
will be exactly  is, by definition of a continuous probability distribution, exactly ). en,
the median of the nonzero elements is returned using the “nth element” partial-sort
variant of the quicksort algorithm.
C++ Code
 using std::vector;
 using std::nth_element;
 // ...
 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < lengths[0]; i++) {
 if(args[0][i]!=0) { // ignore if zero
 value.push_back (args[0][i]) ; }
 }
 std::vector<double>::iterator z = value.begin();
 std::vector<double>::size_type m = value.size()/2;
 std::nth_element(z, z+m, value.end());
 *x = value.at(m); }
Typically, both item-response models and other techniques such as  require
for identification that at least one subject be either fixed at a point (most liberal, most
conservative) or constrained to positive or negative values. In addition, for convenience,
normally all θ are sampled from the sameN (0, σ2θ) distribution, except for some, which
are fixed at a point or constrained to be positive or negative. Such a strategy incorporates a
small amount of prior knowledge, enough to identify the model – but not in the case of

grouped data. In the typical setup we learn what the latent θ are, but practically nothing
about them other than their distribution. e hierarchical setting enables us to incorporate
other knowledge directly that we have about all the judges and also learn about the
relationship between these characteristics and their observed behavior. us, I specify that
ideal points θ have a person-specific mean and common variance:³
θ j ∼ N (X jβ, σ2θ)
ak ∼ N (Gkγ, σ2γ)
β ∼ N (b0, B0)
γ ∼ N (g0,G0),
σ2θ ∼ IG(νθ/2, νθ/2)
σ2a ∼ IG(νa/2, νa/2)
where x is a vector judge covariates and g a vector of case covariates. Under this model the
ideal point is effectively constrained to an interval subset of θ, and β tells us the effect of
each judge attribute. e hierarchical model more closely resembles the typically identified
IRT model when we fix values σ2 = 1, and as few as one j to have Xjβ = {−1, 1} and for all
others x = 0. Even then these are weaker assumptions than the strong constraining
identification strategy, which actually fixes θ for some j. By varying the location and
precision of the parameters β and γ, we can detect the sensitivity of the model to the prior.
e intuition and interpretation of the second-level parameters is straightforward and
powerful:
³Recently some models (e.g. Lauderdale, ) have allowed for computation of heteroskedastic variance
of the person parameters. A similar approach would be suitable for - estimation but is not implemented
here.
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• Ideal points are estimated using both person-level predictors and a vector of
outcomes. Variance σ2θ decreases as the effect of Xjβ explains vote choices. Put
simply, to the extent that β explains vote choices, the lower the uncertainty
contained in σ2.
• e model reduces to a standard unidentified ideal-point model as Xβ → 0 (that is,
all ideal points would be draws from the same normal distribution with mean µθ).
• Predictions about ideal points (and behavior) can be made given only the elements
of x, judge characteristics. In other words, given absolutely no voting history, the
ideal point of a new member can be estimated, with appropriate uncertainty,
knowing only those attributes that make up x. Predictions of voting behavior could
be made by specifying the location of a number of cases.
e joint posterior distribution is then given by:
p(θ , a, β, γ, σ2θ , σ2a∣Y)∝ p(Y ∣θ , a, β, γ, σ2θ , σ2a) ⋅ p(θ , a, β, γ, σ2θ , σ2a) (.)
But the expression on the right can be simplified because of the hierarchical structure. e
second-level parameters β and γ are conditioned only on the first-level parameters θ and a.
We can thus write the following marginal-conditional form of the model (dependence of θ
on X and a on G are suppressed for notational convenience):
p(θ , a, β, γ, σ2θ , σ2a∣Y)∝ p(Y ∣θ , a) p(β∣σ2θ)p(σ2θ ∣β)p(θ∣β, σ2θ)´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
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
Implementing the Eco-IRT Model
emodel described above, especially the connection of person-varying parameters to the
observed data, would be expected to give rise to unusually shaped posterior distributions.
Several situations could cause complications, where the observed data would not neatly
fit the assumed prior model. In one scenario, not enough combinations exist of chamber
membership to distinguish the marginal members of each chamber. is could come about
because members always served together, did not serve with a wide enough variety of other
members, or because the decisions with other chambers are indistinguishable from those
made jointly – the mean or median of two of a member’s chambers is the same for a large
number of decisions. It would also be expected when the model itself is specified with the
theoretically motivated median function allocating judge preferences to decisions. In effect
the mean, or consensus, model, incorporates and smooths over chamber members’
positions. By choosing the median judge we admit uncertainty at the case level over which
judge was the median. If there is enough ambiguity on enough cases, we would expect that
the median model would generate distributions representing a mixture of each possible
location. Depending on the number of groupings, there could be several distinct modes,
each of which represents a plausible latent preference for the individual in question.
A fully Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation produces samples from a
posterior distribution which may have a form that is intractable to other estimation
strategies. At the same time, the method allows us to vary the initial assumptions (called
the prior distribution) about the model.
Other methods of statistical inference rely on optimizing values of the parameters of
distributions in the model with respect to the data. In other words, the distributional
assumption is applied to the data itself. For example, if we assumed that the latent person
parameters that drove the item-response function were normal, the quantities of interest in
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the model would be the parameters of the normal distribution, just two – the mean and
central tendency.
Under many circumstances, such an approach makes sense. But, with such coarse data,
saying that the latent judge preferences are described by a single symmetric normal
distribution is an extremely strong assumption. Furthermore, it may not be possible to
integrate or optimize the latent distribution in the data. Optimization algorithms that
perform “hill-climbing” would get stuck in one mode. We have no guarantee that the
maximized mode is the global maximum for any given parameter (especially the highly
indeterminate judge latent preference parameters); indeed, we expect that in many cases
multiple modes would arise from the observed data.
Fortunately, using MCMC, we can produce an arbitrarily accurate picture of posterior
distributions even for complex models and coursely observed data like that from collective
chamber decisions. By “arbitrarily accurate” I mean that the level of detail about the
posterior distribution is a function only of the number of samples we wish to draw and
retain aer we are confident that the algorithm is drawing samples from the target density.
e MCMC sampling algorithm that we will use is a common special case of a general
algorithm for Bayesian sampling from posterior distributions: the Gibbs algorithm
requires that each parameter at each iteration be fully defined, conditional on the values of
all the other parameters. e chief innovation of the - model is in data
augmentation. All model parameters are always sampled conditional on the data; data
augmentation is a way of representing the data in a way that enables the Gibbs conditional
updates of the other parameters.
In a sense, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm turns the model in reverse as it
steps through the data to build the samples of the posterior distribution. As we built the
model, the result was the outcome Y ; as we sample the parameters, we start with Y and
step through each observation’s contribution first to item parameters a and then to judge
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parameters θ. With the data-level model sampling thus complete, it then proceeds up to
the next level of inference, about the distribution of model-level parameters conditional on
other prior predictors. Again, at every step the order of sampling (learning from the
likelihood contributions of the data) proceeds “backwards” to greater levels of abstraction
or distance from the data.
e method of data augmentation is owed originally to Tanner and Wong ().
Later, Albert and Chib () demostrated how it could be used for binary data in Gibbs
sampling. e method uses the observed data Y to generate values from a truncated
normal distribution, where the location or mean parameter µ is conditioned on all the
other variables in the model, and truncation occurs based on Y .
Sampling algorithm
e results in both this chapter and the empirical application to the Court of Justice in
Chapter  are sampled using , with the stylized median function described above.
Each parameter is updated in sequence as described below, using a full conditional
sampling distribution (there are no Metropolis-Hastings update steps).⁴ e resulting joint
distribution is the posterior p(θ , β, a, γ, σ2θ , σ2a∣Y).
. Sample the latent data Z∣Y , θ , a. is is the data-augmentation step that turns the
dichotomous Y into a continuous Z by drawing from a distribution centered at z∗
computed from the previous iteration’s conditioning variables, and truncated at 
depending on the value of Y . e data Y is a K × J matrix, with values , , or NA.
⁴If there is more than one covariate X or G,  actually uses a Metropolis jump for the multivariate
Normal update of β or γ, rather than the Gibbs update described here.
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e participation matrix is also used in this step to compute the value of θ∗, used to
sample Z.
Ωmean(θ∗j∈g) =∑wkθ∗/#g
Ωmedian(θ∗j∈g) = gmedian(wkθ∗)
z∗ = a∗ −Ω(θ∗j∈g);
e stylized gmedian function, given in the code block on page , returns the
median element that does not exactly equal .⁵
z j∈g ,k ∼ ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
TN+(z∗, ζ2) if y=,
TN−(z∗, ζ2) if y=, (.)
e variance of the augmented data (ζ) follows exactly the parameter-expanded
Probit scheme of Liu and Wu (, ). is parameter expansion greatly speeds
the sampler’s convergence, reducing the serial correlation in Z. Every subsequent
step is normalized with respect to ζ, and I suppress that notation below because it is
unrelated to the data or any parameter of interest.
. Sample the case parameter (a∣θ , Z), and the second-level regression of its mean(Gγ ∣a) and standard deviation σ2a. Both a and θ are essentially Gaussian Bayesian
regressions on the other terms, where the updates below are the typical Gaussian
update in which the prior mean is the linear predictor Gγ or Xβ .
⁵Other ways of computing the median or general “nth element” are possible but the method here exploits
the fact that double-precision floating point random deviates will basically never exactly equal ..
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a ∼ N (µ = [θ′θ
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
]−1 [θ′Z
σ2θ
+ Gγ
σ2a
] , Σ = [θ′θ
σ2θ
+ 1
σ2a
]−1) (.)
γ ∼ N (µ = [G′G
G0
+ g−10 ]−1 [ [G′a]−1 +G−10 g0] , Σ = [G′GG0 + g−10 ]−1) (.)
σ2a ∼ IG (νa + #a2 , νa + SSE(a)2 ) (.)
. Sample θ, and the second-level regression of β and σ2θ :
θ ∼ N (µ = [ 1
σ2θ
+ Xβ
σ2θ
]−1 [ 1
σ2θ
[A− Z] + Xβ
σ2θ
] , Σ = [ 1
σ2θ
+ Xβ
σ2θ
]−1) (.)
β ∼ N (µ = [X′X
B0
+ b−10 ]−1 [ [X′θ]−1 + B−10 b0] , Σ = [X′XB0 + b−10 ]−1) (.)
σ2θ ∼ IG (νθ + #θ2 , νθ + SSE(θ)2 ) (.)
3.2.1 Simulations: Courts with Chambers and Collective Decisions
In this example I generate a stylized set of known parameters to explore how observed
outcomes from groups varies when groups are recombined. Of interest are the Chambers
of the European Court of Justice, which will serve as the motivating example and also
inform the nomenclature I use for the discussion, and notation choices.
e Court of Justice comprises a set of Judges j = 1, . . . , J who sit on a vector of
Chambers (groupings) g = 1, . . . , Gmax. e chambers decide on a non-overlapping set of
cases k = 1, . . . , K by majority vote whether the Commission is right () or wrong () on a
point of European law. Each judge decides based on his individual utility function:
U j,k(yea) −U j,k(nay). (.)
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Each judge’s utility function U(⋅) is a function of his private preference θ j and case
parameter (ak), which map, with a friendly Probit transformation, into a dichotomous
vote choice Y∗ that we do not observe:
Y∗j,k ∼ Φ(−ak + θ j + ε jk ). (.)
en the chamber votes and (only) the majority opinion is revealed as the actual case
outcome Y ∈ {0, 1}.
e court comprises  members, each of whom sit on either  or  chambers. e
chamber size s is either , , , or . Initially we will consider Judges’ utilities to be
distributed Normal with wide variance, θ ∼ N (0, 4). We might also consider an
underlying mixture of distributions representing blocs of pro- and anti-integration judges
giving rise to a bimodal distribution or one with heavier tails (i.e., a t distribution). ese
very likely will be important underlying distributions to consider but for now we stick to
the simpler case.
Next we group the judges into chambers.
3.2.2 Assigning Cases & Calculating the Outcomes
Each case is assigned randomly to a chamber. We also consider what would have happened
if it were randomly assigned to a different chamber, to show that sufficient variation in
outcome occurs as a result solely of chamber assignment. e purpose of this is to
illustrate how over time, collective decisions will evince patterns that may be revealing of
the invidual members’ preferences despite individual votes never being observed.
en, for each judge in the assigned chamber we calculate Y∗ which is a dichotomous
unobserved vote, and take the chamber median’s vote as the final case outcome Y . e
code for this is shown below.

R Code
 > ## Get the chamber outcome from a case and vector of judges
 > ## Args: 1 x 2 case parameters
 > ## jg x 1 judge ideal points
 > ## Out: chamber's outcome the median judge's preference
 >
 > cases$chamber <- sample(1:ncol(chambers), K, replace=TRUE)
 > chamberDecision <- function( case, judges ) {
 + Ystar <- sapply(judges, function(x){
 + theta_j <- x
 + ystar_jk <- -case["a"] + theta_j
 + return(ifelse(ystar_jk > 0, 1, 0))
 + })
 + return(median(Ystar))
 + }
 > cases$Y <- apply(cases, 1, function(x) {
 + case <- x
 + judges <- theta[chambers[,case["chamber"]]==1]
 + return(chamberDecision(case, judges))
 + })
It was necessary to construct several configurations of simulated data to show how the
algorithm performed with different types of variation in the ecological groupings of
members into chambers. I show four pairs of simulated results, in decreasing order of
randomness of composition. e pairs are made up of the two allocation functions in the
data augmentation sampler, using the mean of the members, or the median. In the first,
most random pair of simulations, all possible combinations of twelve-choose-three are
observed more than once. In the second pair of simulations, the size of the chambers is
allowed to vary, which causes the mean or median allocation to be slightly more blurry
about the individual contributions on the observed data. e next pair takes a fixed
number of possible groupings – smaller than than the total possible combinations of
twelve-choose-three or twelve-choose-five, but larger than a single rotation of chamber
membership – and allocates cases randomly among these possible established chambers.
Finally, the last set of simulations presumes that some of the individual decisions (five
percent) are actually revealed. Instead of marking all the participating judges as having the
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same observed vote as we must under “unanimous” collective decisions, dissenters guide
the sampler to greater precision.
e first simulation shows that it is possible for data augmentation, through the
chamber allocation function, to recover the ordering and magnitudes of distances for
individuals based on a completely selection into chambers of three. is is closest to the
allocation of chambers (called panels) in the United States Courts of Appeals, and the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom.
e second simulation shows that the size of the groups can vary; the chambers
comprise either three or five judges from the pool of twelve. is scenario is again not
unlike some courts where the decision of a three-judge panel may be separately decided on
appeal by a larger chamber. e Federal Courts in India function in this manner, where
chambers of five rule on appeals of decisions by chambers of three. I do not explicitly
simulate this procedure, repeating a proportion of the case parameters in chambers of each
size, but its feasibility is established in the second simulation (Section ..).
e third simulation (Section ..) is the closest to my main empirical focus, the
European Court of Justice. A smaller number of chambers are stable and decide a large
number of cases together. e number of established chambers is smaller than the total
number of combinations of three or five that are possible, but large enough to incorporate
joint service of most members with each other multiple times.
In all of the simulations, identification is achieved by a credible signal of the location of
the case parameter – a covariate γ indicating its direction and magnitude. In addition, the
scale of the latent space is identified through a parameter expansion: the cases and judges’
positions are all relative to the mean of all the judges and scaled by the spread (standard
deviation) of the judge preferences. e data-agumentation step is also scaled by an
unidentified random gamma draw of ζ, which is integrated out immediately, but
dramatically improves convergence.
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3.3 Results from Simulated Data
For each of the following subsections, I present the results in the following way, with
selected additional diagnostic information in the Appendix. e - model is run in
 . (Plummer ), with the stylized median function discussed in Section .
added to the appropriate module. Each module is run for , iterations in two parallel
chains with different random starting values. An intial “burn-in” of  iterations is
discarded and the output of the two chains is combined and thinned by an interval of .
Despite the relatively short burn-in, the parameter expansions used ensure quick
convergence to the target distribution.
For each simulation, we can calculate how accurate the model is at predicting the
outcomes. At each iteration i (or a sample of posterior iterations), calculate
Z i = Φ(ai −median(θ i ; θ ∈ θ g)). (.)
If case parameters a are not saved, a less accurate abstraction can be accomplished using G
and γ. en each iteration’s accuracy is the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted. In
this way each simulation yields a distribution of accuracies based on the underlying
posterior samples. Of the  saved values for each iteration, I use a random sample of
 iterations to compute the predictive accuracy. e predictive accuracy of all of the
simulations is discussed in Section ..
e results for the main parameter of interest – the “judge” parameters θ – are shown
as “violin plots”, which are mirrored kernel density estimates from the entire posterior
sample of θ. ey are shown below for each simulation (mean and median) with the usual
“post-processing” transformation (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, ), normalized at
each iteration. e generating values for θ are also normalized and are shown as solid dots.

Figure .: Actual and recovered value for θ for random -member draws using the
chamber-mean sampler.
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3.3.1 Random Compositions of 3
e first simualtion is intended simply to show that individual parameters can be
recovered from collectively observed data at all. Indeed the chains show evidence of
convgergence, and, tellingly, the ordering of the posterior means is nearly identical to the
values of θ used to generate the sample data.
R Code
 > order(theta) # Order of the known generating values
[1] 1 10 7 5 11 12 4 8 6 2 3 9
R Code
 > order(apply( sim1.theta, 2, mean)) # Order of posterior means
[1] 10 7 1 5 11 12 4 8 6 2 3 9

Figure .: Actual and recovered values for -member chambers, chamber median sampler
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To generate this graph, we can simply sum the number of iterations in which θcol > θrow
in the posterior sample, and divide by the number of saved iterations . We will see more of
these plots later, with observed rather than generated (known) simulated data. As one
would expect, for those values where the model did not recover the correct order, we have
less confidence in the ordering as shown on the pairwise matrix.
Convergence
emodel converges to the unique target distribution very quickly due to the parameter
expansions used to decrease autocorrelation of the chains. Below are trace-plots and
autocorrelation plots for the first simulation for a short run of three chains with distinct
starting values.

Figure .: e matrix of pairwise comparisons of judges’ preference estimates. Numbers
indicate the degree of certainty of the ranking of the row relative to the column.
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Figure .: Trace plot of -chain simulation , selected parameters.
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Figure .: Autocorrelation plot of -chain simulation .
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Figure .: Actual and recovered values for random - or -member chambers, chamber
mean sampler.
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3.3.2 Random Compositions of 3 or 5
Next, consider the chambers of either three or five. is pair of simulations (again, using
either the mean or median of the chamber in the data-augmentation step) yields similar
results to the first.
R Code
 > order(theta) # Order of the known generating values
[1] 1 10 7 5 11 12 4 8 6 2 3 9
R Code
 > order(apply( sim3.theta, 2, mean)) # Order of posterior means
[1] 10 1 7 5 11 12 4 8 2 6 9 3

Figure .: Actual and recovered values for random - or -member chambers, chamber
median sampler.
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e orderings above are each not perfect, only very close to the original generating
values of θ. To further explore the simulated model fit, I present the matrix of pairwise
order probabilities. Each cell in the square represents the probability of the given order: for
example, starting at the lower le-hand corner, moving right, the figure represents the
probability that θ7 is to the right or higher than θ10.

Figure .: e matrix of pairwise comparisons of judges’ preference estimates. Numbers
indicate the degree of certainty of the ranking of the row relative to the column.
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Figure .: e matrix of pairwise comparisons of judges’ preference estimates for random
- or -member chambers. Numbers indicate the degree of certainty of the ranking of the
row relative to the column.
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3.3.3 Random Assignment to Relatively Stable Chambers
In constructing the last simulated participation matrix, each case drew three or five judges
completely at random each time. In a set of twelve members, there exist  possible
combinations of , and  possible combinations of . However in order to approach data
more closely resembling the membership on chambers of the European Court of Justice,
we need to approximate more stable groupings that decide many cases together, but where
members serve with each other in distinct combinations. e Rules of Procedure would
suggest considerable stability, with chambers defined and fixed for two years at a time. e
participation matrix for the actual data, which is discussed in Section ., actually reveals
almost  distinct combinations, where a strict reading of the Rules of Procedure would
imply about one-third that number.⁶ erefore, to simulate “stable” chambers, I draw 
possible - or -member chambers, and each case is assigned to one of these fixed
chambers.
⁶In the data considered in Chapter , there are  judges serving at different times, over several enlarge-
ments of the European Union and thus of the size of the Court of Justice. Although they obviously did not
all serve together, there are about  possible combinations of , and , combinations of  among 
members.

Figure .: Actual and recovered values for  stable - or -member chambers, chamber
mean sampler.
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Figure .: Actual and recovered values for  stable - or -member chambers, chamber
median sampler.
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
Figure .: ematrix of pairwise comparisons of judges’ preference estimates for  stable
- or -member chambers. Numbers indicate the degree of certainty of the ranking of the
row relative to the column.
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Figure .: Actual and recovered values for stable - or -member chambers with 
revelation, chamber mean sampler.
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3.3.4 Random Assignment to Relatively Stable Chambers, with 10% of Votes Revealed
is final pair of simulations investigates the performance of the - model when just
some of the individual data are revealed. Where before the outcome matrix was the same
( or ) for all members who participated in a decision ( in the participation matrix), this
time ten percent of all outcomes are revealed. In many instances, the “revealed vote choice”
is the same as it would have been. In some others, however, it represents a dissent. Many
courts or other institutions feature low frequency of revelation of dissent, such that the
- model may be an appropriate way to model the remainder of their choices.

Figure .: Actual and recovered values for  stable - or -member chambers, chamber
median sampler.
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Figure .: Posterior predictive accuracy for simulated data.
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3.3.5 Predictive Accuracy of Simulations
As one would expect, unanimous chamber decisions are able to either conceal or distort
some of the true underlying values of θ in the simulations above. Nevertheless, by
considering results from both mean and median samplers, we uncover striking
heterogeneity. Later, I introduce two refinements to the model that attempt to account for,
using other known predictors, the heterogeneity of preferences revealed by the model.
Further, given a stylized set of random data, the samplers are quite accurate at predicting
outcomes. Figure . shows the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the model
for all of the simulations presented above.
e most random data, representing a random draw of three judges, or three or five
judges, produced the most accurate recovery of generating judge preference values. For
three-judge chambers, Figures . and . show estimates remarkably close to the
generating values. Nevertheless, tested against the same outcomes, the model is accurate
only about  of the time, using either the mean or median of the random groupings.

When random draws are either three or five in size, the chamber-mean sampler (judge
estimates in Figure .) is about as accurate at prediction () as with -member
chambers, but the chamber-median sampler (Figure .) is better at prediction, yielding
correct predictions of outcomes in  of cases. When a limited number of fixed
compositions are specified at the outset, the data are coarser, and more prone to reveal
alternative, incorrect explanations of the data-generating process such as the incorrect
orderings in Figures .–.. e “incorrect” estimates of θ in these figures show a
pattern revealed by the specific participation pattern used for all of them. As it happens,
the pattern produced by the permutation of the data is in fact far better at predicting the
outcomes than either of the first two models that were more accurate in θ. e less random
compositions were between  and  accurate at predicting outcomes. Having some
“revealed” knowledge, as in the last two simulations (Figures . and .), made θ
slightly more accurate, and prediction slightly less so. In reality, the permutations of
membership on Chambers at the European Court of Justice and grouped decisions show
data that is somewhat less random than my “stable” simulation, but not fully random.
Where random chambers result in accurate estimates of θ, greater stability results in a
model better at prediction. Likewise the chamber mean and chamber median allocation
functions trade off, in a sense, faithful estimation of particular parameters of interest and
predictive accuracy.
3.4 Conclusion
e simulations have shown that collective decisions, without revealed votes or dissents,
can in fact still bear the fingerprints of individual actors when there is sufficient variation
in chamber composition. ey have also suggested that if any votes, even very few, were
revealed via published dissents or votes, accuracy would be improved. e

data-augmentation step of the algorithm would be identical; it is the data in this case that
would produce a cleaner, narrower estimate of individual judge parameters I call θ.⁷
e second simulation in each pair introduces the behavior of the chamber-median
- data augmentation step. In this scenario, the decision of the chamber – the only
decision observed – is based on the preference of the median member of the chamber.
Because subsequent steps of the sampler are conditioned on the “augmented” data Z, cases
are more likely to contribute the same value to all members if a member is frequently the
median. e chamber-mean sampler, on the other hand, theoretically represents the
consensus decision. It is indeed likely that many changes of chamber composition – either
by replacement or reshuffle – that would affect a chamber’s mean but not the median. In
the analysis of actual ECJ cases in the next chapter, we will continue to use both the
chamber-mean and chamber-median samplers. ey provide complementary information
about what patterns show in the data.
e chamber median data augmentation sampler represents an important feature of
Bayesian modeling of processes with so much imputed or missing data. We need to
consider the full distribution of values that members could have, given what little data we
observe. Classical methods of optimizing a likelihood would neglect one of the multiple
modes that arise from the missing-data problem. Under the coarser actual data we
investigate later, the median sampler indeed reveals a split with unequal density in two
modes.
I have presented each successively-less-random grouping of judges into chambers in
pairs based on the data-augmentation chamber allocation function being the mean or the
median. Under the still quite random mixture of random draws of three or five members
⁷Data augmentation defines the sampler in terms of the distribution of parameters given data and aug-
mented data. In other words, the estimate of (θ∣Z), the augmented data, is the same as (θ∣Y); the difference
is only that we know how to sample from the conditional distribution of (θ∣Z) because it has an amenable
functional form.

per chamber, the chamber-median result is for one judge quite far from the generating
value, even though the chamber-mean algorithm correctly locates the same parameter.
e model developed here depends heavily on the structure of the data – that is, the
participation of judges on different combinations in chambers. e most random situation
may apply to ad-hoc panels, while the more stable composition more closely resembles the
European Court of Justice, whose chambers system was reviewed at length in section ..
e next chapter builds on the model developed here. I construct a participation matrix
for observed data from the Court of Justice, and also model known features of both cases
and judges with hierarchical predictors.

Chapter 4
Modeling the ECJ: Preferences, Influence,
and Outcomes
In Chapter , I introduced a variety of “constitutional” and other courts, while paying some
special attention to the method of appointment to them. Source of appointment and length
of judges’ terms are to key attributes of institutions that define their independence from the
more democratically accountable branches of government. We considered reasons why
legislatures and executives would “tie their hands” by subjecting their legislation to review.
One of the key formal results relating to delegation to independent institutions relates to
time inconsistency: that someone in power would like to have a hand in appointing an
“independent” (unaccountable) reviewer so that policies may survive a change in power
(be “upheld” as constitutional). Of course, this comes at the cost of potentially having one’s
own policies invalidated by previous-term appointees to the court.
Chapter  introduces the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which functions as a
constitutional court for the European Union based on the EU Treaties as the “constitutional
charter” of the EU.¹ It is well established that the ECJ, in concert with national courts
¹Case / Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament () ECR .

through the preliminary reference procedure, performs this role and has expanded its own
power through key judgments that give EU law (including Regulations and Directives,
within limits set essentially by the ECJ) both direct effect, producing obligations on national
governments, and supremacy over any national laws that conflict with the EU law. ese
daring moves of “judicial creativity”, in addition to “constitutionalizing the treaties”
(Mancini, ), indeed tilted the balance of power from member states toward the EU
institutions. e gradual acceptance of this jurisprudence in all the member states and
continued – even expanded – use of preliminary references was in a way surprising.
Member state governments expressed discontent at times, even outrage; even so, the
constitutional character of the Treaties is by now quite firmly established.
Both the broad strokes of legal theory and fine details of refining judgments have led
scholars to conclude that the ECJ has been an “engine of integration” at the forefront of
federalizing the EU, oen against member states’ wishes (Alter, ; Stone Sweet and
Brunell, ; Mattli and Slaughter, , a; Garrett, )
What past analyses of the ECJ have overlooked, however, is one of its defining features,
and one of the bases of independence of any delegated body and of many constitutional
courts . e diverse sources of appointment, and relatively short term length of  years
(renewable), provide a means for national governments to both “tie their hands” and make
credible commitments to upholding the Treaties, as well as influence the direction of ECJ
jurisprudence through the appointment of its members.
Because by design the Judgments of the Court are ostensibly unanimous –no individual
disagreements, much less formal dissenting opinions to judgments have ever been revealed,
formally or informally, either from the bench or in the writings of the judges aer their
service – scholars have had no choice but to treat the ECJ as a unitary actor. e Court of
Justice, rather than its member judges, has been the motor of European integration. For
many judgments over many years it was reasonable to consider the court as a monolith.

However, as documented at length in Chapter , the ECJ has long divided its workload
among various Chambers. At first, Chambers heard only EU staff cases. Later they began
to hear preliminary references and the ECJ sat less oen as a full court. Privileged parties,
member states and the EU institutions, could always request that a case be heard by the full
court. In the s the court invented a non-chamber chamber called the “petit plenum”
consisting of a quorum of members. Aer the revision of the rules of procedure in ,
even a government request for a full-court hearing was subject to the discretion of the
court. e system of Chambers complicates even the claim that themedian of the ECJ is
consistently pro-integration, because each chamber median has its own median judge.
e growth of the use of chambers inadvertently provides an empirical opportunity to
assess to what extent the Judges of the Court of Justice evince homogeneity of preferences
with respect to integration as commonly alleged. In addition, we can test alternative
hypotheses regarding the dependence of judges relating to their heterogeneity of policy
preferences or behavior. In Chapter  I developed a model for this type of application. In
particular, I extend the commonly used item-response model in two novel ways. First, I
wrap the model at the level of the data in what I call the “chamber allocation function” that
implies each case contributes equally to the judges hearing it. e chamber allocation
function may be the mean, representing something like consensus among members, or the
median, reflecting the provision for majority voting in chambers. As the simulations in
Chapter  showed, the exact permutations of judges and chambers may lead to a series of
outcomes where the mean and median samplers produce estimates that are both wrong in
different ways. erefore, I will consider both as providing distinct and complementary
views. Second, I identify parameters of both cases and judges with predictive hierarchical
prior distributions. In other words, rather than simply scaling the latent parameters like
 or a common IRT model, my - model is designed to enable inferences
about what predicts both the judge and case parameters estimated by the data. Despite

common and increasing application of the IRT model and Bayesian Markov chain Monte
Carlo estimation thereof, few studies seem to take into account hierarchical prior
predictors.
I must emphasize that my claim is not that the Court of Justice has become either
inconsistent in its application of the law, or that the system of Chambers has undermined
its jurisprudence. ese claims cannot in any rigorous way be evaluated, because decisions
of the court are not subject to appeal; one cannot challenge the judgment of a chamber
before the full court. Further, my model depends on leverage from cases decided in
Chambers of  or , and therefore I assume that judges’ underlying preferences are
constant from one chamber to another, and that they behave the same way even when they
do sit as a grand plenum or full court.
Figure . plots the two other measures of judge positions (percentage of cases siding
with the Commission and appointing government R–L score from Kim and Fording
()). At the le of the figure is the proportion of cases on which each judge participated
where the outcome was in favor of the Commission. Even using this aggregate measure,
one might conclude that judges’ dispositions were not homoegenous. Of course, it lacks a
model of individual judge and chamber decisionmaking, so one still could not attribute
these outcomes to variation in judge preferences.
4.1 Data
e data observed comprise a single outcome, attributed to a chamber of judges, per legal
issue. A complete “case” before the Court may encompass several legal issues, with a ruling
on each of them. Furthermore, observations tendered by the Commission or member
states may pertain to one or several legal issues. e fact that cases may contain several
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Figure .: Evidence from judges’ aggregate behavior, and a possible source of motivations
on the bench: the percentage of cases each judge heard in any chamber inwhich the outcome
was in favor of the Commission; and the right–le ideology of their national government
at the time of their appointment. e latter is used as a predictor in the hierarchical model.
e scale is reversed so that the theoretical prediction that right or conservative governments
appoint more Euroskeptical judges. e ordering below is the same as in Figure ..
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legal issues is irrelevant and potentially confusing, since the data are observed at the level
of legal issue. I will therefore use the terms “case” and “legal issue” interchangeably to mean
“the object upon which observations are submitted, decisions are made, and outcomes
revealed.”
e model has a huge number of “moving parts,” or sampled posterior distributions.
ey are needed, though, to answer the central questions of this research. First, do the data
reveal heterogenous judge preferences? is is answered by considering the marginal
distributions of judge parameters. Second, can we predict judge positions with other

theoretically derived covariates? I consider two separate judge-level variables that enter the
model as linear predictors of judge positions. And third, do judges show signs of greater
responsiveness to their own governments’ observations? We extend the model described
above to account for attributes of cases to affect some but not all judges in the chamber.
Here I consider N = Article ² cases – preliminary references – from  to
, in which the Commission announced a position via a written observation and
argued its position at the hearing. ese cases were heard by  unique combinations of
judges (called g in earlier notation); the median number of cases per unique composition
of chamber is  and the mean ; the maximum is  for the chamber of Judges Zuleeg,
Montinho de Almedia, and Grévisse.
Larger configurations of seven, nine, eleven, or thirteen judges (the petit plenum, grand
plenum, and quorum of the full court) have also existed but were used far less frequently
and not at all aer the  reform of the Rules of Procedure. e model, of course, is
agnostic of formal membership in Chambers or the order of rotation – for all (and only)
the judges hearing a given case, a case makes a contribution to judges’ estimate if they are
coded as  in the participation matrix.
e Commission makes and supports more observations than any other party (as
discussed in section .., its policy is to contribute an observation in very nearly all
preliminary reference cases), but it is frequently joined or opposed by other governments.
e position of other member state governments is used to predict the location of the
case-specific parameter of the model. e rationale here is as follows: if the Court and
Commission together are motivated by greater supranational authority, more regulation at
the supranational level, and less regulation at the national level – all of these are the
components of both positive and negative integration – such a preference will be manifest
in case outcomes in which the Court sides with the Commission. Moreover, the member
²ex Article ; ex Article 

states’ observations represent the threat of override or noncompliance when they oppose
the Commission, and would more likely predict an anti-Commission judgment.
Conversely, member states’ observations that side with the Commission should indicate a
willingness to comply and agreement with the integration stance that the Commission
advocates. When member states oppose one another in these observations results in a net
case prediction of .
Overall, the Court sides with the Commission in Preliminary References about  of
the time in the dataset. e model depends on the composition of the chambers deciding
against the Commission. Accounting for the participation matrix, judges side with the
Commission in these cases from  to  of the time. us, by extension, judges are
relatively pro-integration when using the Commission as a proxy of integrationist
tendency.
4.1.1 Prior Predictors for Judges and Cases
Judges appointed by national governments must be minimally acceptable to the
government making the appointment. Judges appointed by right or anti-EU governments
will be more likely to decide cases against the Commission. Since member states can only
evaluate judges at the outset, at the time of appointment, the measure must be observed for
governments at each time they make an appointment. In addition, it needs to vary at the
level of the government, so for coalitions should be weighted by cabinet-seat share of
parties. Few measures meet these criteria.
Some scholars consider expert surveys of party positions to have the greatest face
validity and cross-national comparability. Beginning with Ray (), they have conducted
surveys of most European parties in order to describe party positions on relevant and
timely matters of European integration, as well as le–right economic concerns (Marks
et al., ; Marks and Steenbergen, ; Marks et al., ; Ray, ; Marks, Wilson,

and Ray, ; Ray, ). Unfortunately, these surveys only began in , and therefore
measure aspects of integration that may not apply earlier in time, even to the same parties.
Budge () writes of using expert surveys to gauge party positions,
“If they are based even in part on behaviour they cannot be used to explain
behaviour such as the type of party government which forms. Yet this is one of
the main reasons why estimating party policy positions has become so
important in contemporary political science. If expert judgements do not
constitute pure measures of intentions and preferences they lose most of their
analytic use” ().
It would be unwise to infer positions on integration of governments based on party
positions taken from collections of different experts at different times as a meaningful
measure of government preferences over integration (and thus disposition in choosing ECJ
judges).
I use measures derived from another comparative approach to measuring policy
preferences of parties, based on the text of “manifestos” or programs presented by parties
at each election (Budge et al., ). In each party manifesto from  onward, native
speakers of the language have coded every “quasi-sentence” for its content relative to a
rubric of policy content. e policy domains can be aggregated to form sets of items that
correspond to the theoretical concept of ideological dimensions, such as “le–right” with
le favoring greater government involvement in the economy and greater support for
government provision of social welfare funded by taxes, and right favoring a lower amount
of government regulation of business, lower taxes, and the private provision of social
welfare needs. Budge et al. () demonstrate that both specific policy domains and the
summary measures provide a valid basis for comparison of parties’ policy proposals across
countries and over time. Although other problems of comparability or salience of certain

issues may arise by using party manifestos, they at least have the property of attaching at
the same relative time to the same relative parties that make up governments Budge et al.
(); Kim and Fording (); Budge (), and reflect pre-electoral positions rather
than a mix of positions and behavior in coalition formation, as may be the case with
surveys.
Next, what specific attributes of governing parties are most likely to influence the
choice of ECJ judges? Some scholars find that parties take meaningful positions on
European integration, in other words that it is a strong “second dimension” of political
competition Marks and Steenbergen (). One of the disadvantages of using manifesto
(Budge et al., ) data is that it offers little in the way of policy domains that amount to
“integration.” It does contain a pair of items for manifesto statements that are positive or
negative about the EU; I supplement this with manifesto items about liberalization of trade
versus protectionism. e ECJ may advance integration, but it does so through cases that
are primarily economic. is EU-liberalization measure therefore captures aspects of free
trade and support for EU “negative integration” that differentiate parties on the “second
dimension” of European political competition that might be different from the “first
dimension” of economic le–right position.
However, the dominant le–right ideological dimension of political competition of
mainstream political parties in Europe has been demonstrated to correlate strongly with
positions and policies regarding European integration. More specifically, the policy
content of the le–right idelogical dimension relating to regulation and the role of
government in economic affairs relates directly to the cases that come before the ECJ.
Although extreme parties of both the le and the right oen strongly oppose integration,
within the mainstream – those parties that govern or join governing coalitions – le
parties are consistently more supportive of supranational governance than right parties
(Hix, ; Hix and Lord, ). is is even true for the United Kingdom, where the

ideological drive for deregulation might have led the Conservative party to favor “negative
integration;” it did not, presumably because the Tories strongly preferred deregulation at
their own hand rather than by any supranational authority (Featherstone, , ).
Aspinwall () writes, “the location of parties and governments in Le–Right space
serves as a good independent explanation of preferences on integration” (). McElroy and
Benoit () find from their own survey of party experts that le parties tend to favor
integration more than right parties.
I expect that this relationship holds in the judges they would appoint to the ECJ. As a
measure of the le–right orientation of the government at the time of first appointment, I
use cabinet-share weighted manifesto scores from Kim and Fording ().
Hypothesis: Judges In Chapter  I remarked upon a commonly accepted but untested
assumption that judges share a uniform preference for integration. If this is true,
judge preference estimates will be undifferentiated, or highly dependent on the
model prior distribution. For interpretation, the model is specified such that an
increase in the value of θ judge position is associated with a greater propensity to
decide cases against the Commission.
Hypothesis: Judge Predictors Judges appointed by right or anti-EU governments will be
more likely to decide cases against the Commission. Two separate predictors are
used, as discussed above, both derived from cabinet-weighted party positions on
both the le–right ideological space, and a measure of pro-EU and free trade versus
anti-EU and protectionism. In both cases, Positive values of the parameter β
attached to the judge predictor are should increase the “distance” in the latent utility
space, resulting in a lower propensity to vote in favor of the Commission.

Figure .: Le–right ideology of governments appointing ECJ judges. Figures are based
on party Manifesto scores of Budge et al. (), weighted by cabinet seats, to arrive at the
overall government position (Kim and Fording, ). e values below make up X: the
predictor Xβ is the hierarchical prior mean of the distribution of judge preferences θ.
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Hypothesis: Selective Judge Effects In section .. below, I consider a further refinement
to the model of judges’ individual behavior. If so, and if judges preferences are
indeed distinct from one another, it is possible that they will respond to their own
home governments’ observations with greater acuity than other governments.
Negative values of δ, discussed in Section .., are consistent with this prediction.
Hypothesis: Cases Some attributes of cases apply to all the judges on the panel. Carrubba,
Gabel, and Hankla () suggested that member state observations may signal the
threat of noncompliance and showed that the balance of observations is a strong
predictor of case outcome. In Chapter  I generated a covariate based on the actual

case position. e net number of observations with respect to the Commission
(opposing minus supporting) thus predicts the location of the case parameter in the
latent space. Negative values of γ would be consistent with the findings in Carrubba,
Gabel, and Hankla (). In other words, an increasing number of observations
against the Commission provide a signal about potential noncompliance or override,
which in the case-level analysis of Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla () is shown to
affect all the judges on the chamber.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Individual Judge Preference Estimates
Figure . shows the estimated ideal points of judges from  preliminary references and
the predictors discussed above for judge and case positions. e model here is identical to
those developed in Chapter ; its purpose is to recover estimates based on variations in
outcomes as a result of composition of chambers. A chamber-allocation function
aggregates over the judges in the chamber; case and judge positions are estimated in latent
space and their distance results in the mean value for a data-augmentation probit link
function connecting the observed dichotomous data with the augmented continuous data.
Further, the model is identified with respect to the latent space through the use of a
hierarchical prior predictor for the case position. In Chapter , I generated this value
calling it a “credible signal” of a theoretical value. Above, I explained that the predictor (the
net number of observations with respect to the Commission position) is revealed to all
judges, and if it is a signal of potential noncompliance it should affect all the judges on the
chamber uniformly. In other words, as in Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla () and Garrett
(), even if judges were homogenous in their own preferences for integration, the threat
of noncompliance affects them all equally and would cause them to rule differently from

their preference for integration. e same assumption underlies most work on the ECJ’s
role in making European policy.
e joint distribution of judge preferences in figure . shows strong evidence that
judges do not share a common motivation to integrate Europe. As predicted, the insulation
of the institution has provided equal cover to relative euroskeptics and europhiles alike.
e variation in chamber composition has enabled us to separate the likely effects of the
different groupings, controlling for the attributes of the case that would affect any chamber
equally. However, because we do not observe every possible combination of judges, we
learn more about some judges than others. (As I noted earlier, the chamber of
Zuleeg–Almeida–Grévisse heard more cases together than any other grouping and is thus
poorly separated.)
Figure . alone contradicts the strong claim that is either implicit or explicit
throughout the literature about the Court of Justice, that its judges are all motivated by a
common drive for greater integration. e results show that judges in fact have divergent
preferences, and that their imputed policy preferences vary in systematic ways. is result
is robust to the precision of the prior and alternative starting values.³ Even when we begin
with relatively strong or weak beliefs about judge parameters, the data imply a posterior
distribution like the one in Figure ..
³All the models in the paper have attained conventional measures of convergence, oen relatively quickly
and with very low autocorrelation thanks to a parameter-expansion sampling scheme. All starting values are
random draws at the time of initialization and multiple chains yielded similar posterior draws; only draws
from one chain are presented. e variance of hyperpriors – the spread of β and γ – was set at , , and 
with similar results. e models presented have a relatively “flat” prior variance of  for both β and γ.

Figure .: Estimated ECJ judge positions (θ) from ecological item response (-)
model.
Mean and 90% Posterior Density
Ju
dg
e,
 T
er
m
, N
at
io
na
lit
y
Schintgen | 1996-05 | LU
Higgins | 1985-91 | IE
Koopmans | 1979-90 | NL
Almeida | 1986-05 | PT
Galmot | 1982-88 | FR
Everling | 1980-94 | DE
Velasco | 1988-94 | ES
Slynn | 1988-92 | UK
Sevón | 1995-03 | FI
Murray | 1991-99 | IE
Gulmann | 1994-05 | DK
Joliet | 1984-95 | BE
Grévisse | 1981-82 | FR
Zuleeg | 1988-94 | DE
Kapteyn | 1990-05 | NL
Kakouris | 1983-97 | GR
Hirsch | 1994-05 | DE
Jann | 1995-05 | AT
Due | 1988-94 | DK
Schockweiler | 1985-96 | LU
Puissochet | 1994-05 | FR
Wathelet | 1995-05 | BE
Bosco | 1976-88 | IT
Iglesias | 1994-00 | ES
Edward | 1992-05 | UK
Mancini | 1988-99 | IT
Ragnemalm | 1995-05 | SE
Bahlmann | 1982-88 | DE
Stuart | 1984-88 | UK
Pro-Commission Anti-Commission

Figure .: e distribution of case parameters a from the full model.
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e sampled distribution of case parameters is shown below in Figure .. e majority of
cases have values greater than , which means that only the most committed anti-federalist
judges would be predicted to vote against the Commission, though the model does predict
that some judge parameters θ are high enough to imply an anti-Commission vote with
greater than . probability even for those cases. us, the recovered dimension of the
model, and the range of θ, appear to explain some amount of substantive variation.
4.2.2 Predictors of Judge Preferences
I turn now to the second related but distinct claim about ECJ judges: that their motivation
for integration is either at odds with, or simply distinct from (uncorrelated with) the
preferences of member states. Given that the judges are appointed one per member state,
this would require that member state governments disregard their own European
dispositions in selecting judges, or that they can’t select well, or that the judges’ preferences

change once they are in Luxembourg. In figure ., I show the posterior distributions from
the model for two predictors of judge positions. e predictors are based on information
available at the level of parties and aggregated to governments by proportion of cabinet
seats (Kim and Fording, ). On the le is the le–right ideology as measured by party
Manifesto coding; on the right is an alternative measure of parties’ positions on European
integration (Hooghe and Marks, ).
Figure . shows two alternative covariates to predict judge behavior: the le–right
cabinet median discussed earlier, and a similar cabinet median of a similar normalized
index of two other items coded in the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset: position
(positive of negative) on the European Communities / European Union, and position on
liberalization versus protectionism.⁴
⁴is alternative “integration index” is available at the same level of precision (all countries in all years) as
the Manifesto-based le–right index. It correlates weakly with the L–Rmeasure and identifies the same coun-
tries as being “anti-integration” as expert surveys that only classify parties/governments into three categories.
A trichotomous coding (pro, anti, neutral) produces almost identical results to those presented in Figure .
with the continuous Manifesto-based covariate.

Figure .: Posterior density plots of two prior predictors of judges’ preferences.
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e posterior distributions of these hierarchical prior predictors produce two notable
findings: First, the distribution of βLR is heavy at , with another peak around 0.4. Eighty
percent of the distribution lies on the positive side of zero, indicating a weak prediction
that judges appointed by right governments are more likely to take positions against the
European Commission; and judges appointed by le governments are more favorably
inclined toward the Commission’s position. e shape of the posterior distribution is
inconsistent the claim that some le governments would appoint protectionist judges and
some right governments free-market crusaders: these claims would together imply
negative β. Instead it is apparent that for some judges the appointing government’s
le–right ideology has no predictive power, while for others it is stronger.⁵ ese findings
⁵Indeed oddly-shaped posterior distributions like the one for βLR above is a major advantage of Bayesian
modeling: we do not have to assume that the effect is normally distributed about some value of β. A mixture
makes sense, given the variations in appointment patterns described earlier. It is likely that countries where
ECJ appointments are politicized and contentious are the ones contributing higher positive values of β here.
Coding and controlling for these country-level variations is the subject of future research.

are also robust to the specification of “skeptical” (negative mean) or less informative (wide
variance) values for (b0, B0), the prior distribution of β.
Second, the le–right positions of parties in government is a better indicator of the
kinds of judges governments will appoint than is a comparable Manifesto-based indicator
of their positions on the European Union and market liberalization. Other expert
assessments of le–right or pro–anti-integration correlate strongly with the measures used
here, and do not do a better job predicting judges’ observed behavior of siding with or
against the European Commission, taken as an indicator of support for integration or
regulation at the European rather than national level, which is centered at −0.03 and
almost perfectly symmetric about zero.
We also tested whether observations from national governments predicted case
positions. e quantity γ is the estimate of the influence of each additional government on
the “location” of the case. It is the unit effect that applies to all the judges in the chamber.
Consistent with previous findings, observations from national governments are a strong
predictor of case outcomes.
Figure .: Prior predictors β and γ for judges and cases, respectively.
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Estimates of the regressions of case and judge covariates on the hierarchical priors are
shown in Figure .. Above, I noted that the posterior distribution of second-level prior
predictors, in particular those pertaining to judges, could be used to test theories about the

influences on judicial behavior. e posterior distribution of β, the vector of coefficients in
the regression of predictors on judge preference estimates, allows us to do exactly that.
4.2.3 Selective Judge-Specific Observation Effects
e next model estimates the effect of a judge’s own country’s observations on outcomes of
preliminary references. In Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla (), observations are assumed
by necessity to affect all of the hearing judges equally. Likewise Garrett () assumes that
all judges are equally responsive in tailoring their rulings to the anticipated preferences of
powerful member states. Kilroy () tests, again assuming uniform judge responses, the
effects of several combinations or ad-hoc coalitions of governments making observations /
interventions. All of these findings are based on the assumption that judges respond
uniformly to all observations. By contrast, the following model allows us to test whether
under specific conditions judges respond differently to some observations than others.
One obvious selective condition, which I test below, is the position of their own
country’s government in those cases where it submits an observation. is finding could
plausibly be interpreted as one of national governments controlling or communicating
how they wish the judge to vote – rather, for the same reasons judges may serve in a
Chamber on cases to which their national government is a party: they are more familiar
than the other judges with the national laws and legal systems. ey may furthermore,
especially in preliminary references, be the only judge in the chamber to speak the
language of the case as a mother tongue. Of course, the stronger claim of responding to a
government’s indicated preferences is possible as well, but it is by no means the only reason
that judges might respond differently than their peers on the Chamber to their own
government’s observations.
A (k × j)matrix is constructed where entries D are 1 when a judge’s (columns j)
member state submits an observation on the same side as the Commission in case k, −1

when a judge’s member state submits an observation against the Commission’s position.
is type of model which estimates an effect conditionally for some subjects on some items
is typically called “differential item functioning” and implies the following model:
ω jk = Φ⎛⎝ak − ∑
#g
j=1 θ j∣θ j ∈ θ g
# jg
− δ jkD⎞⎠ (.)
where a is still predicted by γ times case covariates c that affect the whole panel, and θ by
judge covariates x that affect the judge on all cases with strength β.
e number of nonzero entries in D ranges (by judge) from  to , with a median and
mean both around . It assumes that observations for and against the Commission have
the same weight. Not surprisingly, controlling for these observations increases slightly the
precision of the estimates of judges’ positions, shown in Figure .. e order of a few is
changed, but in broad strokes the results are the same.
Hypothesis: Own-Country Observations Observations from a judge’s own government
sway opinion independently and more strongly than those from other governments.
A negative value of δ is evidence of responsiveness in the expected direction given
the coding of D. (An observation with the Commission, coded +, selectively
decreases the judge’s position from the case position in the latent space. An
observation against the Commission, coded −, increases that distance.)
I first present the model’s new estimates of judge positions θ, having controlled for the
possibility that the heterogeneity revealed in figure . on page  could be a result of this
selective differential response to obesrvations. Figures .– . show that this is not the
case. Controlling for individually selective response to observations, judges show a similar
degree of heterogeneity of preferences. Figure . shows these same results estimated using

the chamber-median sampler, and reveals a specific type of multimodal uncertainty that
can arise in data-augmentation settings.
Figure .: Estimated ECJ judge positions (θ), controlling for the presence and direction of
their own governments’ observations in cases.
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Figure . below shows the results for judge parameters for the same model, on the
same data, using the chamber-median - sampler. e difference in allocation
function reveals a particular kind of uncertainty in the model: where for large numbers of
cases different judges were the median in the chamber.

Figure .: Violin plot of chamber-mean estimated judge positions (θ) accounting for own-
government observations’ effect δ.
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
In general the chamber mean sampler smooths over these alternatives presented by the
permutations of chambers in the data. Both produce accurate predictions in  of cases
when tested with saved case parameters,  (chamber mean) and  (chamber median)
when tested with G and posterior γ; and  and  when tested with G, γ, D, and δ.
Compared to the performance of the - model at parameter-recovery and predictive
accuracy, discussed in section .. on page , the it is no surprise that accuracy falls
somewhere in between the randomly-constituted - or -member chambers and the more
stable set of possible chambers: the distribution of cases to judges appears less than purely
random, but with more permutations () than the simulations ().
It is possible that the model is recovering, as did the simulations using stable chambers,
an alternative distribution of judge preferences that predicts the data given the
permutations of chambers. It would be unwise to take the estimates in figure . very far
from the context of the model. For this reason, I do not do a two-step estimation
procedure for the predictors of judge positions; this would throw out the uncertainty and
admit potential bias if, for example, I purported to predict a point estimate such as the
posterior mean, using covariates. e hierarchical model ensures that uncertainty in θ is
propagated through to the estimates of β.
e purpose of estimating the case-judge-specific effect δ was to test the hypothesis
that national governments influence their judges through the observations they submit.
Indeed, this is the case, as the distribution of δ and β in Figure . shows.
Figure . presents evidence that individual judges may have specific, contextual
responses to certain observations. Above I suggested several reasons that observations
from one’s own home country’s government might produce an effect distinct from that of
the “piling on” of observations from other governments. It may be a greater understanding
of national law and legal system, which the government helpfully clarifies and the judge is

Figure .: Violin plot of chamber-median estimated judge positions (θ) accounting for
own-government observations’ effect δ, using chamber-median sampler. Because many
contain multiple modes and to facilitate comparison with Figure ., points are ordered
by the mean of the chamber-mean estimate.
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
able to convey to the rest of the chamber. It may be a matter of language, especially in
preliminary references where the judge may be the only native speaker of the language of
the case. It may also result from a concurrence of preference between the national
government and the judge, the former having been revealed in the observation.
To interpret the results for δ, the specific effect of the judge’s home government’s
observation, consider the latent space. e distance between a judge and a case produces
an outcome in favor or against. e effect of δ is to perturb the judge’s distance from the
case, all else equal. Suppose a case is somewhat pro-integration and two governments
oppose it. A judge’s own government presents an observation in favor of the Commission,
reducing the latent distance and increasing the probability that the judge votes in favor of
the Commission, while allowing his own underlying preference to remain unchanged. In
this sense it “controls” for the unusual presence of home-government observations.
e wide, overlapping bands in Figure . understate just how much information the
model has actually recovered from the permutations of chambers. Although we have not
observed a single within-chamber judge-vote, the ordering and position of judges relative
to one another is described by the pairwise comparison of their marginal distributions.
e matrix of these pairwise comparisons is shown in Figure ..

Figure .: Prior predictors β, δ, and γ: judge positions, the effect of home-government
observations, and chamber effects of all observations.
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
Figure .: e matrix of pairwise comparisons of judges’ preference estimates. Numbers
indicate the degree of certainty of the ranking of the row relative to the column. For example,
the model is  certain that Schintgen lies to the le of Higgins and  certain he is
le of Everling. Even though both ends of the joint distributions in Figure . – Judges
Schintgen and Stuart – overlap each other, the model is  certain that Stuart is to the
right of Schintgen.
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Convergence
I presented graphical convergence diagnostic plots for the first, most random simulation in
Section .., and suppressed the subsequent repetitive plots. It is worth showing the
behavior of the median sampler with the actual data – as before, a shorter run of three
distinct chains with different starting values. For the parameters showing multiple modes,
notice that all three chains visit the same regions. e results presented in Figures .
and ., and discussed in the text are from , iterations of a single chain, retaining
every th sample, discarding a burn-in period of  iterations – an extremely
conservative choice given the evident mixing of the chains.

Figure .: Trace plot of -chain chamber-median sampler with judge-specific δ, selected
parameters.
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Figure .: Autocorrelation plot of -chain median sampler with judge-specific δ for ,
iterations, retaining every th sample.
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4.3 Summary
As discussed in Chapter , the ECJ is a powerful institution affecting policy in the
European Union. Because of its institutional insulation from the member states and the
other supranational institutions – the Commission and the Council – it has the capacity to
affect policy with few constraints. Many scholars believe that it has advanced integration
independently and counter to member states’ preferences. Moreover, it has the means to
do so, through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy; and it has the opportunity,
through a steady stream of preliminary references from national courts with litigants
seeking European remedies against national laws. Having means, opportunity, and
institutional insulation though do not imply that the individual judges have a motive to
pursue integration against the will of the member states. It is therefore surprising that so
strong a claim could be made as that of Hartley, which I restate:
“One of the distinctive characteristics of the European Court is the extent to
which its decision-making is based on policy. By policy is meant the values
and attitudes of the judges – the objectives they wish to promote. e policies
of the European Court are basically the following: ) strengthening the
Community (and especially the federal elements in it); ) increasing the scope
and effectiveness of Community law; ) enlarging the powers of Community
law. ey may be summed up in one phrase: the promotion of European
integration” (Hartley, , ).
e same basic claim is either stated or implied in the work of Carrubba, Gabel, and
Hankla (); Alter (, , ) – that judges possess not only the means and
opportunity but also themotive to decide cases in favor of integration. e claim has two
parts: first, judges’ motivations are homogenous (they all prefer integration to roughly the

same degree) and second, they develop this preference endogenously on the court, and
their federalist predlications are unalterable and unpredictable.
In response to the first question, Do judges reveal observable patterns of heterogeneous
preferences? Yes, though as in most item-response models, the positions of adjacent judges
are sometimes ambivalent. Two types of null result were possible: the distributions could
exhibit greater, or even total, overlap; or they could be overly sensitive to the prior
information. Instead, the preference estimates of the judges is determined by the data
rather than the prior distributions.
e second part of the claim that judges have a common preference for integration is
more subtle. It suggests that their behavior would reveal such motives regardless of the
preferences of the member states. As I discussed in section .. on page , if this were
true, there would be no systematic relationship between judges’ behavior or revealed
preferences and the preferences of member state governments that appoint them. My
findings do not support this claim. We can predict the dispositions of judges based on
other information. Consistent with expectations, the median le–right position of the
government that initially appointed each judge is a (weak) predictor of judges’ preference
estimates. An alternative measure of government positions based on the median party’s
position on the EU and trade liberalization, did not predict the judges’ positions at all. In
addition, do judges respond more strongly to observations submitted by their own home
governments? Again, evidence supports the claim that judges favor the position of the
observation of their own governments, whether supporting or opposing the Commission,
over and above other governments’ observations.
e model here offers an additional way to test the effects of government observations,
with microfoundations that account for the heterogeneity of judges’ preferences, and the
organization of the court into chambers. As figure . on page  shows, most of the work
of the court is in chambers, so it is increasingly important to account for the composition

of the chambers and how outcomes might be affected by different judges, since it is clear
that they are are not interchangeable.
Most normative and positive theories about constitutional review are based on the
incentives presented to individual judges. Institutions are designed to safeguard
independence, but constraints such as the threat of override and the threat of removal (or
non-reappointment) also encourage more responsive behavior. eories about the ECJ
have been stymied by the ecological problem of collective decisions, which is a common
attribute of “independence” especially for constitutional courts. Greater institutional
insulation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for independent behavior. It is equally
plausible that the institution is insulated and unconstrainted in order to maximize the
policymaking capacity of judges whose ideology reflects that of member state governments.
e model developed here uses the organization of the court into chambers of various
compositions to infer individual judges’ preferences. To date, little research has
conceptualized the court as a collection of individuals each with interests and preferences.
e - model developed here offers new, more rigorous tests for existing theoretical
hypotheses about the ECJ’s deference to certain actors and preference for integration. e
complex interactions of national politics, integration, and enlargement offer a rich vein for
future research.
Finally, and most broadly, I would speculate that some of the ECJ’s design features –
above all the multiple sources of appointment – that it shares with other constitutional
courts probably has similar effects in other settings. Whoever makes appointments can be
expected to appoint like-minded individuals as judges; judges, in turn, appear to behave in
both representative and responsive ways.

Chapter 5
Institutional vs. Behavioral Independence
e primary puzzle addressed by this work is the relationship between institutional and
behavioral independence. Scholars focusing on institutional independence have largely
overlooked the behavioral consequences of providing judges with the means and
opportunity to exert their own policy preferences. is oversight stems from a deliberate
agnosticism regarding the preferences of judges, and a focus on features that would induce
a departure from true preferences. e implication there is that judges should be
unencumbered from implementing their own policy preferences. Scholars focused on the
ECJ have assumed that judges share a particular policy preference, for supranational
authority and more integration.
To what extent do the guarantees of institutional independence for constitutional
courts – a normative means to bolster the rule of law – empower judges to exhibit
behavioral independence? One of the major empirical hurdles to assessing judicial
independence is its measurement. In general judicial independence is indicated by ) the
presence of constraints on judges through term limits, removal, salary, budget, and other
features of the court itself, and ) the frequency of compliance, noncompliance, and
override of judgments of the court. But these two metrics confound another – in particular

a constrained and unconstrained court that both enjoy compliance are observationally
equivalent. One cannot tell whether the court is exercising its true preferences and the
government complies because it wants to show respect for the rule of law, or the court is
responding to constraints that induce a government-friendly judgment. Without taking
seriously the policy preferences of judgments and governments, institutional and
behavioral independence remain inextricable. We cannot infer from the absence
(presence) of constraints or the frequency of (non)compliance anything about the
relationship of the preferences of the court relative to the government. “Dependent” and
“independent” behavior are equivalent unless the policy preferences of both government
and judges are specified.
e normative basis for institutional insulation is to ensure that a court does not face
(or at least respond to) pressure to rule in a particular way. In other words, insulation or
cover seeks to remove the possibility of inducing a change between the true preferences of
judges and the revealed preferences or behavior.
I developed this argument in the context of the European Court of Justice, which
provides both a good example of a court possessing the means and opportunity and
institutional cover to act unconstrained, but also one that is subject to strong claims about
themotive of judges to exhibit behavioral independence of a particular type. Most scholars
of the European Court of Justice tend to believe that its judges, possessing the means and
opportunity to advance integration, also possess a motive to do so. e logical fallacy here
is that the cover provided by the institution implies the behavioral independence of the
judges. Even if this were true – if judges’ behavior were completely unconstrained and
independent – it does not imply anything about the underlying preferences of the judges.
Most emphatically, it does not imply a Euro-federalist agenda. Nevertheless strong claims
have been advanced about the independent, integrationist preferences of ECJ judges.

One feature that ought to correlate meaningfully with judges’ preferences is the
preferences of whoever appoints judges. In the judicial independence literature diverse
sources of appointment are generally associated with greater independence (a normative
good), and most constitutional courts have some degree of this feature. erefore, selection
should matter even more to member states, and they should want to choose ECJ members
with preferences reflective of their own – even more so because of institutional isolation.
In large part, previous research on the ECJ, and other work on judicial
decision-making, is thwarted by one of the features that provides cover for judges’
behavior. Like many courts, ECJ judgments are issued collectively. Unlike, for example, the
United States Supreme Court, no one knows how individual judges voted on any case. is
feature reinforces the claim that ECJ judges are predisposed toward integration – but I
argue in Chapter  that the institutional cover for Europhiles applies conversely perhaps
even more, by masking the dissents of minority Euroskeptics under the “unanimous”
collegial decisions. However, teasing potential anti-integration dissents out of the data
requires some way to map the individual contributions to each decision.
Fortunately, the ECJ also provides unique leverage on the individual contributions to
decisions. Its way of dividing work among judges in “Chambers” means that the actual
deciding judges are known – on any given case, they are a subset of the full court, and to
some extent random. e specific nature of case participation determines how well the
model can pick up on individual judge differences.
In Chapter , I develop a model to account for decisions taken by subset groups like the
Chambers of the ECJ, in which individual member votes are not revealed. However, the
design of the participation matrix means that it applies to a broader class of subset
decisions; and the outcome matrix also allows for selective revelation (some votes
revealed). In addition, I show how the decision rule within chambers can also be modeled
explicitly, and develop samplers for both a mean and median function representing

consensus and strict majority rule. e model developed in Chapter  enables inferences
about the ECJ, but should be portable to other contexts as well. In Chapter  I extend the
model further by modeling selective responsiveness to case attributes.
Using observed data from the Court of Justice, comprising thousands of preliminary
references, and almost  distinct combinations of hearing judges, I show in Chapter 
that judges’ preferences are not uniformly pro-integration and in fact correlate as expected
with the preferences of the member-state governments that appoint them. In the present
work, I add precision to the finding of Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla () that judges
respond in a particular way to government observations. In fact, I show that while this is
true overall, judges seem to pay particular heed to the governments of their home
countries. e statistical machinery used in section .. has myriad potential further
applications where judges might respond selectively to some governments more than
others.
e modeling strategy used here has many future applications and refinments.
Potential applications include not only the ECJ but other courts, including the British
House of Lords, as in Robertson (), the Courts of Appeals, as in Hausegger and
Haynie (), and the United States Courts of Appeals, as in Sunstein, Schkade, and
Ellman (), all of which use some degree of random subset chambers or panels to
decide cases, but which have not benefitted from an individual judge-level model of
decisions. It may also be applicable to institutions in which published dissent is rare but
observed sometimes, and an individual-level model of heterogenous preference would
make sense for decisions that would otherwise have to be discarded from the analysis.
In sum, the data, model, and results show that the ECJ’s institutional independence has
not necessarily led to the behavioral independence that ECJ scholars have assumed the
Court has engaged in, pushing for greater integration. Instead, because judges are
institutionally shielded, member state governments appear to appoint judges with

preferences similar to their own. e judgments result not from the collective application
of a common preference for integration, as has been commonly assumed, but from the
majority decision of judges with different policy preferences.

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